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I. INTRODUCTION
The government contract defense' is an affirmative defense2 that shields a
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, University of Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale
Univeristy.
1. Courts and commentators have used a variety of terms to describe this defense. Many courts have referred to
it as the "'government contractor" defense. E.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 404 (4th Cir. 1986); Bynum v.
FIC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 558 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115,
117 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Esehler v. Boeing Co., 106 S.Ct. 851 (1986); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol,
Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 72 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696
F.2d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 1982). The court in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 739 n.3 (1 th Cir. 1985),
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manufacturer from liability if the product causing injury complied strictly with design
specifications set forth in a government procurement contract. 3 The defense was first
used by public works contractors to bar claims against them for damage to land and
other property. 4 However, in recent years, product manufacturers have invoked the
government contract defense to avoid liability to third parties for defectively designed
products supplied to the government. 5
Despite widespread judicial acceptance of the government contract defense in
products liability litigation, a number of issues are still being hotly debated. One
controversy involves whether the government contract defense should be limited to
military equipment or whether it might apply to other products such as vaccines
supplied to the government under contract. 6 Another question is whether the
government contract defense should be allowed when the contractor participates
extensively in the design of the product.7 In addition, the courts disagree about
whether the government contract defense is controlled by state law or federal
common law.8
called it the "military contractor" defense. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986).
Other courts have used the term "government contract" defense. E.g., Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844,
844 (1lth Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1985); Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp.
1359, 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re All Maine Asbestos Litig., 575 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (D. Me. 1983); Johnston v.
United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 353 (D. Kan. 1983); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 792
n.37 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Mackey v.
Mamemonlt Corp., 350 Pa. Super. 415, 419, 504 A.2d 908, 910 (1986).
2. Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 106 S.Ct.
72 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, sub nom. Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co., 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Mackey v. Maremont Corp., 350 Pa. Super. 415, 420, 504 A.2d 908, 911
(1986); Comment, Agent Orange and the Government Contract Defense: Are Military Manufacturers Immune from
Products Liability? 36 U. MltkI L. Rv. 489, 495 (1982).
3. E.g., Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359, 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div.
of Boeing Co., 553 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72
(1986). The government contract defense is not applicable to manufacturing defects. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d
556,573 (5th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cit. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984).
4. E.g., Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940); Green v. ICI Am. Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263
(E.D. Tenn. 1973); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965). See also Note, Liability
of a Manufacturer for Products Defectively Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1025, 1049-55 (1982).
5. E.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cit. 1986); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736
(11th Cir. 1985); Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1985); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556
(5th Cir. 1985); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger., 769 F.2d 115 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, sub nom. Eschler
v. Boeing Co., 106 S.Ct. 851 (1986); Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol,
Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 72 (1986); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982), appeal after remand, 741 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1984); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704
F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Pa. 1985);
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), and relatedproceeding, 534 F. Supp. 1046
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984), later
proceeding, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Mackey v. Maremont Corp., 350 Pa. Super. 415, 504 A.2d 908 (1986);
McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1983); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J.
Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, 75
N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978); Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348,428 N.Y.S. 2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd,
79 A.D. 2d 1117 (1981).
6. See infra notes 241-60 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 272-322 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 341-78 and accompanying text.
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To a large extent, the answers to these questions depend on the underlying
rationale behind the government contract defense. Again, there is no consensus
among courts or commentators. One theory is that the defense depends on the
existence of an agency relationship between the contractor and the government. 9 A
more popular explanation is that protection for contractors is necessary to carry out
the policy that underlies the Feres doctrine. 10 Others have argued that the defense is
grounded on broader considerations of sovereign immunity and separation of
powers. " I
This article takes the position that the real objective of the government contract
defense is to protect governmental decisionmaking against collateral attacks in the
courts. This concern is similar to the interest promoted by the discretionary function
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.' 2 The discretionary function exception
prevents litigants from bringing tort suits against the government in order to challenge
the correctness of policy decisions by members of the executive branch;' 3 the
government contract defense bars tort actions against suppliers in a similar manner
when such litigation would threaten the exercise of discretion by government officials
in the procurement area.' 4
It has been suggested that tort actions brought by injured parties against
government contractors do not impair government decisionmaking to the same extent
as suits against the government itself. If this is so, the government contract defense
is not necessary to protect any governmental interest and merely insulates product
manufacturers from liability at the expense of injured victims.15 On the other hand,
limitations on contractor liability are warranted in situations where such lawsuits do
pose a threat to government decisionmakers. The problem, therefore, is to fashion a
rule that protects the government without providing unnecessary immunity to
contractors.
Part I of this article introduces some of the principles that have influenced the
modem government contract doctrine and provides an overview of significant recent
decisions. Part II analyzes the policies which underlie the concept of strict products
liability and examines the rationale for the government contract defense. Finally, Part
III discusses some aspects of the government contract defense that have not been
completely resolved by the courts.
9. See, e.g., Comment, Government Contract Defense: Sharing the Protective Cloak of Sovereign Immunity After
McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 181, 221-25 (1985).
10. See, e.g., Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 72 (1986); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 560-63 (5th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704
F.2d 444, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
11. See, e.g., Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 1985); Burgess v. Colorado
Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
13. Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency "Discretion," 57 TuL. L. REV. 776, 807 (1983).
14. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1982); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J.
Super. 1, 9,364 A.2d 43, 47 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), cert. denied,
75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978). See also Comment supra note 9, at 190.
15. Comment, The Government Contractor Defense: Preserving the Government's Discretionary Design Deci-
sions, 57 ThE'. L.Q. 697, 719 (1984).
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H. INTRODUCToRY CONCEPTS
A. Limitations on Federal Tort Liability
The concept of sovereign immunity prohibits a private citizen from suing the
government without its consent.' 6 Congress partially waived the federal govern-
ment's tort immunity in 1946 when it enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).' 7
However, the FTCA contains a number of limitations on this statutory waiver of
immunity. One of these limitations is the discretionary function exception.'s In
addition, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the government's claim of
immunity against liability to military personnel for service-related injuries. 19 This is
known as the Feres doctrine. 20
The discretionary function exception and the Feres doctrine are concerned with
maintaining military discipline, controlling government procurement costs, and
protecting the integrity of governmental decisionmaking. Although the government
contract defense limits the liability of private contractors rather than the government,
its underlying rationale is similar to that of the discretionary function exception and
the Feres doctrine.2' Therefore, it will be helpful to examine these concepts in more
detail before analyzing the government contract defense itself.
1. The Discretionary Function Exception
Although the FTCA22 waives the federal government's immunity against tort
liability in many cases, a provision of the Act retains sovereign immunity for any
claim "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.''2 3 The purpose of
16. Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286,
288 (1846); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821). See also Note, Military Medical Malpractice
and the Fetes Doctrine, 20 GA. L. REv. 497, 499 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Note, Military Medical Malpractice]; Note,
If You Can't Save Us, Save Our Families: The Feres Doctrine and Servicemen's Kin, 1983 U. Ilu. L. Ray 317, 319
(1983).
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), (c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110,2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412(c), 2671-2680 (1976,
Supp. 1986).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). See also Comment, Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 67 GEo. L. J. 879 (1979).
19. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
20. See Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MIcH L. Rav.
1099 (1979).
21. See Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on
9111/82, 769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos v.
Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354(3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 72 (1986); McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Brown v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1982); Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965); Comment, supra note 15, at 705-06.
But see infra notes 189-240 and accompanying text.
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), (c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412(c), 2671-2680 (1976,
Supp. 1986).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). See also Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretionary Function
Exception Revisted, 31 U. Mtmn L. REv. 161, 168 (1976).
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this provision is to allow members of the executive branch of government to carry out
policy decisions without unwarranted judicial interference. 24
Dalehite v. United States,25 decided in 1953, was the first Supreme Court case
to interpret the FTCA's discretionary function language. The Dalehite decision arose
out of the celebrated Texas City disaster. Shortly after World War II, the government
commissioned private contractors to manufacture fertilizer from surplus explosive
compounds as part of a plan to export vital materials to Europe and Asia. These
contracts provided detailed specifications for the manufacture, packaging, labeling,
and shipping of this fertilizer.2 6 A cargo vessel loaded with fertilizer and other
volatile substances exploded while in port, causing many deaths and extensive
property damage in the port area of Texas City.
Many people brought suit against the United States, alleging that the government
and its contractors were negligent in bagging the fertilizer at a dangerously high
temperature, coating the bags with a flammable paraffin compound, and failing to
label the bags properly. 27 The trial court held in the plaintiff's favor, but the circuit
court reversed, holding that the government was immune from suit for injuries
relating to a discretionary act by the War Department. 28 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held that the government was immune under the discretionary
function exception to the FFCA because the acts in question were mandated by
decisions made at the planning rather than at the operational level. 29
Although the planning-operational distinction is sometimes difficult to
apply, 30 it remains the most widely used formula for determining when a suit is
barred by the discretionary function rule. 31 Generally, planning decisions contain an
evaluation of factors such as the political, economic, or social effects of a particular
plan or policy. 32 Operational level decisions, on the other hand, relate to the
ordinary day-to-day operations of the government. 33 Decisions at the operational
level do not involve the evaluation of policy factors. 34 The distinction between
24. Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 143 (5th Cir. 1981); Rogers, supra note 13, at 807.
25. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id. at 39-42.
28. In re Texas City Disaster Litig., 197 F.2d 771, 778-81 (5th Cir. 1952), Aff'd, Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. is (1953).
29. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1952).
30. Comment, supra note 2, at 519.
31. See Note, The Government Contract Defense in Strict Liability Suits for Defective Design, 48 U. Cia. L. REv.
1030, 1034 (1981); Comment, supra note 18, at 888-93; Comment, Federal Tort Claims: A Critique of the Planning
Level-Operational Level Test, II U.S.F.L. REv. 170, 179 (1976).
32. E.g., Miller v. United States, 522 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1975) (promulgation of air safety regulations); Scanwell
Lab., Inc. v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 910 (1976) (determination of whether
agency bidding requirements had been met); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841
(1967) (refusal by Attorney General to bring suit to enforce statute); United States v. Gregory, 300 F.2d 11, 13 (10th Cir.
1962) (dredging of canals pursuant to Bureau of Reclamation irrigation project).
33. E.g., American Exch. Bank of Madison, Wis. v. United States, 257 F.2d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 1958) (failure by
GSA to install handrail on post office steps); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 75-78 (D.C. Cir.
1955), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 907 (1955) (negligence by air traffic controller); Hoffman v. United States, 398 F.
Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (failure to follow FAA regulations with respect to issuance of ATCO certificate).
34. E.g., Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 219-220 (N.D. Cal. 1964). See also Harris & Schnepper,
supra note 23, at 171; Zillman, The Changing Meanings ofDiscretion: Evolution in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 76 Mu..
L. REv. 1 (1977).
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planning and operational activities would, of course, be applicable to military
decisions. 35
2. The Feres Doctrine
The Feres doctrine limits the liability of the United States Government for
service-related injuries to members of the armed forces. The rule originated in Feres
v. United States36 -a landmark case decided by the United States Supreme Court in
1950. The decedent in Feres died in a barracks fire while on active duty. His
executrix brought suit against the United States, alleging that the government had
negligently operated the heating system and had failed to maintain an adequate fire
watch. 37 The government asserted a claim of sovereign immunity. The district court
agreed with the government and dismissed the suit. This decision was affirmed by a
federal circuit court38 and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
The Court agreed that the federal government should be immune from suit,
notwithstanding the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court found that
the relationship between the government and members of the armed forces was
distinctively federal in character. 39 The Court believed that allowing local law to
determine servicemen's substantive rights4o would be inconsistent with this federal
relationship. 41 In addition, the Court noted that the Veteran's Benefits Act42
established a system of "simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or
death of those in armed services." '43 According to the Court, this Act, which
operated on a no-fault basis, provided injured servicemen with more generous
benefits than comparable state workers' compensation statutes. 44 Thus, injured
35. E.g., Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1975) (failure to install warning signals and
crosswalk at Air Force base held to be operational); Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1972) (exclusion
of civilian from military base held to be discretionary); Abraham v. United States, 465 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1972) (decision
by Strategic Air Command to fly aircraft at supersonic speeds held to be discretionary); Maynard v. United States, 430
F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1970) (decision by Strategic Air Command to fly aircraft at supersonic speeds held to be
discretionary); United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98, 102 (9th Cir. 1962) (negligent construction of sewage disposal
system by Army engineers held to be operational); Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 67, 76-77 (D.
Minn. 1963) (selection of particular flight plan for military aircraft held to be operational); Note, supra note 20, at
1122-25.
36. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
37. Id. at 137.
38. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949).
39. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950).
40. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that liability is to be determined "in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
41. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950).
42. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1976).
43. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).
44. Id. at 145. The Court also declared that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not create new causes of action, but
merely allowed suits to be brought against the government that would otherwise be barred by sovereign immunity.
According to the Court, there was no relationship in the civilian sector comparable to that of the government and members
of the military. Therefore, the Court maintained, no one could bring a common law action based on breach of any duty
arising from such a relationship. Id. at 141-42. This reasoning, known as the "parallel liability" theory, has since been
rejected by the Court. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159-60 (1963) (negligence by prison personnel);
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957) (negligence by government firefighters); Indian Towing Co.
v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955) (failure to repair lighthouse).
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military personnel would have a remedy even if the government was immune from
suit.
The Court later extended the Feres rule to third party actions in Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp. v. United States,45 holding that the United States could not be
joined as a third-party defendant when an injured serviceman brought suit against a
government contractor. 46 In Stencel Aero, a member of the National Guard was
injured when the ejection system of his F-100 fighter aircraft malfunctioned. The
plaintiff sued both the United States and the supplier of the defective ejection system.
Stencel Aero, which had manufactured the system according to the government's
specification, cross-claimed against the United States for indemnity. 47 The United
States moved for dismissal of both the plaintiff's suit and the manufacturer's
cross-claim, arguing that both actions were barred by Feres.48 The trial court
accepted the government's position. 49
On appeal, the Court enumerated three reasons why recovery should be denied
for service-connected injuries: (1) the distinctly federal character of the relationship
between the government and members of the armed forces; (2) the availability of
adequate compensation to injured servicemen through the Veterans' Benefits Act; and
(3) the effect that a suit by a serviceman against the government would have on
military discipline.50 The first two reasons given by the Court were also mentioned
in the Feres decision, and the third was derived from United States v. Brown,5 1 a
medical malpractice case decided by the Court four years after Feres.
5 2
The Court concluded that each of the reasons that had been invoked in the past
to bar suits against the government by servicemen also precluded indemnity actions
against the government by third parties. First, according to the Court, the relationship
between the government and its suppliers was no less "distinctly federal in
character" than the relationship between the government and military personnel.
Thus, if the liability of the government to a serviceman should not depend on the situs
of the injury, there was no reason to apply a different rule to determine the
government's liability to a contractor. 53
Second, the Court declared that the Veterans' Benefits Act provided adequate
compensation to injured servicemen, thus precluding the need for suits against the
government. Moreover, in the Court's view, Congress intended for the Veterans'
Benefits Act to act as an upper limit on the government's liability for service-
connected injuries. Therefore, allowing an indemnity action against the government
45. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
46. Id. at 673.
47. Id. at 667.
48. Id. at 668-69.
49. Id. at 666. The trial court's decision was upheld by the court of appeals. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United
States, 536 F.2d 765, 770 (8th Cir. 1976).
50. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977).
51. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
52. The plaintiff in Brown, a discharged veteran, alleged that he had been given negligent medical treatment in a
Veterans' Adminstration Hospital. Although the Court cited the maintenance of military discipline as a reason for
prohibiting suits against the government by military personnel, it allowed the plaintiff to sue because he was no longer
a member of the armed forces. Id. at 112-13.
53. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977).
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"would be to judicially admit at the back door that which has been legislatively
turned 'away at the front door. '54
Finally, the Court concluded that indemnity actions against the government would
impair military discipline. The Court observed that a suit concerning an injury to a
serviceman, whether brought by the victim or by a third party, would inevitably focus
on the reasonableness of military decisions and their effect on servicemen's safety.
Consequently, a trial would entail second-guessing of military orders and might even
require members of the armed forces to criticize each other's decisions and actions. 55
The Feres doctrine has been sharply criticized by legal scholars.5 6 Nevertheless,
it remains viable, and courts still rely on the doctrine to bar suits by servicemen
against the government for service-connected injuries.57 In addition, as mentioned
earlier, many courts have expressly relied on the rationale of the Feres decision as
support for limiting the liability of government contractors to servicemen injured by
defectively designed products.5 8
B. Limitations on the Tort Liability of Contractors
Two doctrines are often used interchangeably by the courts in contractor liability
cases. The first of these concepts is known as the contract specification defense, and
the second is called the government contract defense. The contract specification
defense is based on negligence principles and should be confined to negligence cases.
The government contract defense, on the other hand, is based on the principle of
shared immunity. Although this defense was first invoked by contractors in public
works cases, many courts have extended it to products liability cases as well.
1. The Contract Specification Defense
The contract specification defense, which applies to both private59 and govern-
ment contractors, 6° provides that a contractor is not liable for damages that result
54. Id. at 673 (quoting Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972)).
55. Id. It has been suggested that the military discipline rationale actually raises three distinct concerns as follows:
(1) disruption caused by the release of information from factual inquiries; (2) the chilling effect of damage awards against
the government on military decisionmaking; and (3) the encouragement of disobedience against military superiors. Note,
Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform of the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 992, 1003-1008
(1986).
56. See generally Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 Ruros L. Ray. 316 (1954);
Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F.L. REv. 24 (1976); Note, Federal Liability to Personnel
of the Armed Forces, 20 GEo. WAS. L. REv. 90 (1951); Note, Military Rights Under the FTCA, 43 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
455 (1969).
57. United States v. Shearer, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 3043-44 (1985); Carter v. City of Cheyenne, 649 F.2d 827, 829
(10th Cir. 1981); Stansberry v. Middendorf, 567 F.2d 617, 618 (4th Cir. 1978). See also Note, Military Medical
Malpractice, supra note 16, at 517; Comment, supra note 15, at 708-09.
58. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 (7th
Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 72(1986); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9111182, 769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied
sub. nom. Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106 S.Ct. 851 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
59. Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973); Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 221 F. Supp. 129
(N.D. Ind. 1963); Moon v. Winger Boss Co., 205 Neb. 292, 287 N.W.2d 430 (1980).
60. E.g., Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 936 (1951); Roth
v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 108 F. Supp. 390, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Castaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.,
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from specifications furnished by an employer unless they are so obviously defective
and dangerous that a competent contractor would not have followed them. 6' The
assumption behind this rule is that an ordinary contractor does not have sufficient skill
to evaluate design specifications provided by an employer62 and must rely on the
employer's superior knowledge and expertise. 63
The contract specification principle is a specialized application of the familar
negligence concept of reasonable reliance. 64 Although the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct may be relevant in a negligence suit, it should not be relevant in
a products liability action based on strict liability in tort. Consequently, although a
few courts have recognized the contract specification doctrine in product liability
litigation, 65 most courts have refused to apply it to such cases. 66
2. The Government Contract Defense in Public Works Cases
The government contract defense protects a public contractor against liability for
consequences that are inherent in the nature of the operation; the work must be done
in accordance with plans and specifications and under the direction and supervision
of government officials. 67 In such cases, the contractor is said to share in the gov-
ernment's immunity from suit.68
376 A.2d 88, 90 (Del. 1977); Rawls v. Ziegler, 107 So. 2d 601, 605 (Fla. 1958); Arnold v. Edelman, 375 S.W.2d 167,
172 (Mo. 1964); Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171, 173, 121 A.2d 781,782 (1956).
61. RmrATasrT (SEcoND) oF ToRrs § 404, Comment a (1965); Note, supra note 4, at 1032.
62. As the New York Court of Appeals declared in Ryan v. Feeny & Sheehan Bldg. Co., "[a] builder or contractor
is justified in relying upon the plans and specifications which he has contracted to follow unless they are so apparently
defective that an ordinary builder of ordinary prudence would be put on notice that the work was dangerous and likely
to cause injury." 239 N.Y. 45, 43-44, 145 N.E. 321, 321-22 (1924).
63. Littlehale v. E.I. Du Pont de Memours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d
274 (2d Cir. 1967). However, a higher standard is imposed when the contractor employs an expert. See Person v.
Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832, 834-36 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 936 (1951); Note, supra note 31,
at 1036-37.
64. The law of negligence provides many examples where courts have held that a person may reasonably rely on
the superior skill or knowledge of another. E.g., Carter v. Franklin, 243 Ala. 116, 173 So. 861 (1937) (worker reason-
ably relied on foreman to warn others of danger); Hackett v. Perron, 119 N.H. 419, 402 A.2d 193 (1979) (motorist
reasonably relied on garage to repair brakes properly); Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N.H. 415, 135 A. 20 (1926) (tenant
reasonably relied on landlord to install gas heater properly); Jessup v. Sloneker, 142 Pa. 527, 21 A. 988 (1891) (worker
reasonably relied on foreman to warn others of danger).
65. E.g., Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1974); Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d
373, 375 n.2 (4th Cir. 1973); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 170-71,583 P.2d 276, 281-82 (1978); McCabe
Powers Body Co., v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Ky. 1980).
66. See Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S.
3 (1975) (contract specification defense relevant to negligence but not to strict products liability); Johnston v. United
States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Kan. 1983) (same); Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165, 174 (D. Kan 1980)
(contract specification defense would frustrate goals of strict products liability).
67. E.g., Mitchell v. Hahn, 131 Ark. 286, 198 S.W. 528 (1917); Timothy J. Foohey Dredging Co. v. Mabin, 118
Ark. 1, 175 S.W. 400 (1915); Timothy J. Foohey Dredging Co. v. Lovewell, 115 Ark. 606, 170 S.W. 1012 (1914);
Wood v. Drainage Dist. No. 2, 110 Ark. 416, 161 S.W. 1057 (1913); De Baker v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 106 Cal. 257,
39 P. 610 (1895); Fitzgibbon v. W. Dredging Co., 141 Iowa 328, 117 N.W. 878 (1908); Bennett v. Town of Mt. Vernon,
124 Iowa 537, 100 N.W. 349 (1904); Hanrahan v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 114 Md. 517, 80 A. 312 (1911);
Rodriguez v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 193 N.J. Super. 39, 45, 472 A.2d 146, 149 (1983); Cobb v.
Waddington, 154 N.J. Super. 11, 16, 380 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1977); Lydecker v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 91 N.J.L.
622, 103 A. 251 (1918); Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N.Y. 156, 31 N.E. 328 (1892); Simons v. Tri-State
Constr. Co., 33 Wash. App. 315, 322, 655 P.2d 703, 708 (1982); Smith v. Gen. Paving Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 858,
860-61,321 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1974). Lamed v. Holt & Jeffery, Inc., 74 Wash. 274, 133 P. 460 (1913); See also Annot.,
9 A.L.R.3d 382 (1966).
68. Note, supra note 4, at 1032.
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The leading case is Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co.,69 decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1940. Yearsley was a suit between a federal
contractor and a riparian land owner who claimed that the construction of dikes along
the Missouri River had caused erosion to his property. The plaintiff prevailed at trial,
but the lower court's decision was reversed on appeal by the circuit court.70
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling. The Court
reasoned that the immunity that protected officers and agents of the federal
government acting within the scope of their authority should be extended to private
contractors who also acted on the government's behalf.71 According to the Court:
.. . [I]t is clear that if this authority to carry out the project was validly conferred,
that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of Congress, there is no
liability on the part of the contractor for executing its will.' '72 The court also observed
that the landowner could have sought compensation from the government for his
injury in the court of claims. 73 Apparently, it thought that the plaintiff had attempted
to circumvent the accepted statutory procedure by suing the contractor instead of the
government. 74
Over the years, courts have advanced various theories to explain the government
contract doctrine. For example, the Court in Yearsley suggested that the contractor
partakes of the government's immunity because it has acted as an agent of the
government. In fact, some courts have limited the government contract defense to
situations where there is an actual agency relationship between the contractor and the
government. 7"
However, a more persuasive rationale for the government contract defense is
that such protection is necessary to allow the government to carry out its essential
functions. Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States76 is illustrative of this view. 77 The
defendant dredged a portion of the Thames River in order to allow nuclear powered
submarines to reach their base at Groton, Connecticut. Material pumped from the
river was deposited upon several adjacent tracts of shoreland property. According to
the plaintiff, gases and other noxious substances escaped from these deposits and
damaged the exterior of his nearby apartment buildings. 78
69. 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
70. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 103 F.2d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
71. Id. at 21.
72. Id. at 20-21.
73. Id. at 21.
74. Id. at 21-22. The Court, however, did not decide the question of whether erosion of the plaintiff's land
constituted a taking of property that required just compensation by the federal government. Id. at 21.
75. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 564 (5th Cir. 1985) (dictum); Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502
F.2d 867, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1974); Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1969).
76. 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965).
77. See also Green v. ICI Am., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). The plaintiff in that case sued the
operators of the Volunteer Army Ammunition Plant in Tyner, Tennessee, arguing that fumes and vapors produced by the
plant constituted a private nuisance. The plant was owned by the federal government and operated on its behalf by ICI
America. There was no allegation of negligence in connection with the plant's operation. Consequently, the federal
district court granted the defendant contractor's motion for summary judgment on the theory that ICI America shared in
the government's immunity. The court concluded that nuisance actions against government contractors would seriously
interfere with the completion of public works projects authorized by Congress. Id. at 1265-66.
78. Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Conn. 1965).
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The landowner brought suit against both the contractor and the government, and
each responded with a motion for summary judgment.79 The federal government
asserted the defense of sovereign immunity, arguing that its decisions relating to the
channel improvement project fell within the "discretionary function" provision of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 80 The trial court agreed with this contention and
dismissed the suit against the government. 81
Having decided that the government was immune from suit, the court then
concluded that the contractor should be immune as well since it had merely followed
the government's instructions and had committed no independent act of negligence.
In the court's opinion, the purpose of the discretionary function exception was to
allow government officials to make risk allocation decisions; to impose liability upon
the contractor would undermine this policy. 82
It should be noted that the government contract defense is subject to some
important limitations. First, the doctrine only protects the contractor against necessary
or incidental damages and does not cover damage resulting from willful tort or
negligence in the performance of the work. 83 Moreover, the contractor remains liable
for the consequences of any discretionary act.8 Furthermore, many courts have
refused to recognize the government contract defense when the contractor engages in
"ultrahazardous" or "inherently dangerous" activities such as blasting. 85
79. Id. at 825.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
81. The plaintiff claimed that the government's selection and approval of the site and method for deposit of the soil
was negligence at the operational level and, therefore, outside the ambit of the discretional function provisions. The court,
however, characterized the government's choice of disposing of the dredged material as discretionary even though it
acknowledged that other choices were available that would have prevented harm to the plaintiff's property. Dolphin
Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965).
82. The court declared:
To impose liability on the contractor under such circumstances would render the Government's immunity for
the consequences of acts in the performance of a 'discretionary function' meaningless, for if the contractor was
held liable, contract prices to the Government would be increased to cover the contractor's risk of loss from
possible harmful effects of complying with decisions of executive oficers authorized to make policy judgments.
Id. at 827.
83. Holland v. Yellowstone Pipe Line Co., 306 F.2d 621,625 (9th Cir. 1962); W. Contracting Corp. v. Titter, 255
Md. 581, 590, 258 A.2d 600, 605 (1969); Bounds v. Scott Constr. Co., 498 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo. 1973); Givens v.
Sellars, 273 N.C. 44, 50, 159 S.E.2d 530, 535 (1968); Transcon Lines Corp. v. Cornell Constr. Co., 539 P.2d 1372,
1376 (Okla. 1975); Perdue v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 161 S.E.2d 250, 256 (W. Va. 1968).
84. Merritt, Chapman, & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1961); Sam Finley, Inc.
v. \Vaddell, 607 Va. 602, 606, 151 S.E.2d 347, 351 (1966); Note, supra note 4, at 1053.
85. The contractor has generally been held liable when the injury was caused by the casting of material upon the
plaintiff or his property. Asheveille Constr. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 19 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1927); Hall v. Ellis &
Brantley, 238 Ky. 114, 36 S.W.2d 850 (1931). When the injury resulted from concussion or vibration, some courts have
still held the contractor strictly liable. Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128
(1967); Monroe v. Razor Constr. Co., 252 Iowa 1249, 110 N.W.2d 250 (1961); Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe
Bros., 260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900 (1963); Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol Chem. Corp., 37 N.J. 396, 181 A.2d
487 (1962); Walczesky v. Horvitz Co., 26 Ohio St. 2d 146, 269 N.E.2d 844 (1971); Ellison v. Wood & Bush Co., 153
W. Va. 506, 170 S.E.2d 321 (1969); Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Corp., 146 W. Va. 130, 118 S.E.2d 622
(1961). Other courts, however, have imposed liability only when the contractor has been negligent. Pumphrey v. J.A.
Jones Constr. Co., 250 Iowa 559, 94 N.W.2d 737 (1959); Nelson v. McKenzie-Hague Co., 192 Minn. 180, 256 N.W.
96 (1934); Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N.Y. 156, 159, 31 N.E. 328, 330 (1892); Newberry v. Hamblen
County, 157 Tenn. 491, 9 S.W.2d 700 (1928).
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II. THE GOVERNMENT CoNTRAcT DEFENSE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
Although some courts appeared reluctant to extend the government contract
defense from public works to products liability cases, 86 the concept has achieved
general acceptance during the past decade. Several leading cases will be reviewed in
this section to provide a general overview of the doctrine as it has been applied in
products liability litigation. In addition, some of the more important variations of the
defense will be briefly examined.
A. An Overview of Recent Developments
State courts in New Jersey and New York were among the first to recognize the
government contract defense in products liability cases. 87 Sanner v. Ford Motor
Co.,88 decided in 1976, concerned a suit brought by a serviceman who was thrown
from an Army jeep and injured. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer, Ford Motor
Company, claiming that the jeep was defectively designed because it had no seat belts
and no rollbar. 89 Ford denied that the jeep was improperly designed and also
contended that it should not be held liable because it manufactured the jeep strictly
in accordance with government plans and specifications. 9°
The trial court stated that the government contract defense was necessary to
enable the government to formulate policy and make military decisions. 91 Accord-
ingly, it granted a summary judgment in the defendant's favor.92 This ruling was
affirmed on appeal. 93 The appellate court acknowledged that the government contract
defense had been limited in the past to negligence actions, but concluded that the
rationale behind it could also be applied to suits based on strict liability in tort. 94
86. The government contract defense was rejected in Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir.
1974). In that case a serviceman was injured when a hand grenade exploded prematurely. The plaintiff recovered against
the manufacturers of the grenade and its fuse on a theory of strict products liability.The manufacturers attempted to invoke
the government contractor defense. On appeal, the circuit court held that the defense was inapplicable since the
government's specifications did not call for the defendants to manufacture a defective product. Id. at 874. It has been
suggested that the court refused to allow the government contract defense in Foster because the injury in question was
caused by a manufacturing defect, not a defective design. Note, supra note 4, at 1056.
87. See also Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 803-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380
F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967); Hunt v. Blasius, 55 I11. App. 3d 14, 18, 370 N.E.2d 617, 620 (1977), aff'd, 74 Il. 2d 203,
384 N.E.2d 368 (1978).
88. 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977),
cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978).
89. Id. at 5, 364 A.2d at 44-45.
90. Id. at 4-5, 364 A.2d at 44. The jeep in question was officially designated as an M151AI 1/4 ton four-wheel
drive utility truck. It was designed to be used as a cargo and personnel carrier, battlefield ambulance, weapons platform
with a 106-mm-recoiless rifle, and a communication vehicle. The Army did not believe that the installation of seat belts
would be consistent with these intended uses. Similar vehicles manufactured by Ford for the Air Force were equipped with
seat belts. Id.
91. Id. at 9, 364 A.2d at 47. The court declared:
To impose liability on a governmental contractor who strictly complies with the plans and specifications
provided to it by the Army in a situation such as this would seriously impair the governments [sic] ability to
formulate policy and make judgments pursuant to its war powers.
92. Id. at 5, 364 A.2d at 45.
93. 152 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977).
94. Id. at 409-10, 381 A.2d at 806.
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A New York court recognized the government contract defense in 1980. In
Casabianca v. Casabianca,95 a young boy was injured when he caught his hand in the
blades of a dough mixer in his father's pizza shop. The machine had been built
according to Army specifications for use in field kitchens during World War 11.96 The
plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer, Teledyne Readco, arguing that the
mixer was designed defectively because it lacked a protective guard. 97 The trial court
granted Teledyne's motion for summary judgment, holding that the government
contract defense absolved it from liability. Without such immunity, the court
reasoned, suppliers might be encouraged to withold essential equipment from the
military in time of war when they considered a particular design to be dangerous. 98
Federal courts also rapidly accepted the government contract defense in products
liability cases. The first significant case was Agent Orange,99 decided in 1980. Agent
Orange was a class action suit brought by former servicemen and their families agaist
a group of chemical companies to recover for injuries resulting from the soldiers'
exposure to chemical herbicides in Vietnam. 100 The manufacturers cross-claimed
against the federal government for indemnification or contribution. The federal
district court was required to rule upon various issues, including a motion to dismiss
based on the government contract defense. 101 Although the court did not dismiss the
case, it did rule that the government contract defense might be raised by the
defendants at trial. 102
The court stated that no deterrent purpose would be served by imposing liability
on an "otherwise innocent contractor whose only role in causing the injury was the
proper performance of a plan supplied by the government."' 03 The court also
concluded that holding military contractors liable would undermine the government's
ability to make risk allocation decisions because contractors would simply increase
the cost of performing government procurement contracts to reflect their potential tort
95. 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981).
96. Id. at 349, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
99. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), and related proceedings, 534
F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied sub. nom. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984),
later proceedings, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
100. The plaintiff's included Vietman veterans, spouses, children, and parents. The veterans sought to recover for
personal injuries caused by exposure to Agent Orange and other defoliants while serving in Vietnam. Some of the children
sought to recover for birth defects caused by their father's exposure to these chemicals. In addition, some of the wives
sought to recover for miscarriages caused by genetic damage to their spouses from Agent Orange. Id. at 769.
101. These included the following: (1) the government's motion to dismiss the manufacturers' indeminity claim on
grounds of sovereign immunity; (2) plaintiffs' motion for class actions certification; (3) defendants' motion for summary
judgment; (4) plaintiffs' motion to proceed with "serial trials"; and (5) plaintiffs' motion to serve and file a fifth verified
complaint. Id.
102. Having decided that the government contract defense was potentially applicable, the court went on to consider
whether the defendants had made a sufficient showing to warrant a summary judgment at this stage of the proceeding. The
chemical manufacturers argued that they were "merely agents of the government acting under the compulsion of federal
law in patriotic furtherance of the Vietnam war effort" and that they "produced an effective product that met, in every
respect, the government's detailed specifications and expectations." Id. at 795. Nevertheless, the court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the defendants' relationship with the government and their
performance under the government contract involved disputed issues of fact that would have to be resolved at trial. Id.
at 796.
103. Id. at 793.
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liability.' 0 4 Finally, the court expressed concern about subjecting government
contractors to tort liability when they were unable to alter design specifications
dictated by the government.10 5
At a later stage in the Agent Orange litigation the court proposed a formula for
determining when the government contract defense should be applied. Under the
court's approach, the defendant could avoid liability if it proved the following: (1) the
government established the product's specifications; (2) the product supplied com-
plied with these specifications in all material respects; and (3) the government knew
as much or more than the supplier about any risks in the product's design. 0 6 The
court later ruled that the defendants had established the first two elements of the
defense, 10 7 but the case was settled before it could be determined whether the third
requirement had been satisfied. 0 8
Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,109 decided in 1982, concerned an Army
reservist, who was injured while seated in a tractor-bulldozer. He sued the
manufacturer, Caterpillar, alleging that his injuries would not have occurred if the
bulldozer had been equipped with a protective structure around the passenger seat. 110
Caterpillar maintained that it was insulated from liability because it had built the
bulldozer according to government specifications. The district court agreed and
granted summary judgment for the manufacturer. "'
On appeal, the circuit court, applying state law, predicted that Pennsylvania
courts would allow suppliers to raise the government contract defense in products
liability cases.11 2 At the same time, the court acknowledged that a manufacturer must
strictly comply with the specifications of its contract in order to avoid liability.
Observing that the contract was "a veritable tome of technical specifications, bidding
notices, and communications between the government and Caterpillar," the court
declared that it could not determine whether the contract called for the addition of a
protective structure on the bulldozer. " 3 Accordingly, it reversed the district court's
summary judgment and sent the case back for trial on that issue. 114
McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.,115 the most significant government
contract defense case to date, was decided one year after Brown. In that case, two
Navy pilots were killed in separate accidents when they ejected from disabled RA-5C
"Vigilante" reconnaissance aircraft. Their deaths were apparently caused by a design
104. Id. at 794.
105. Id.
106. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
107. In re " Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1274 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
108. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
109. 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982).
110. Id. at 247.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 252. Pennsylvania recently did extend the government contract doctrine to products liability actions. See
Mackey v. Maremont Corp., 350 Pa. Super. 415, 419, 504 A.2d 908, 910 (1986).
113. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 256 (3d Cir. 1982).
114. Id. at 257.
115. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
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flaw in the aircraft's HS-1A ejection system. 116 Both the aircraft and the ejection
system were manufactured by Rockwell. 1 1 7 The widows of the two pilots brought suit
against Rockwell and prevailed in the district court.' 18 On appeal, however, the
circuit court concluded that the supplier could raise the government contract defense.
The McKay court held that the manufacturer could avoid liability if it could
prove the following: (1) the United States was immune from suit; (2) the government
established or approved reasonably precise design specifications for the product; (3)
the equipment conformed to these specifications; and (4) the supplier warned the
government about patent errors in the design specifications or dangers involved in the
use of the product that were known to the supplier but not the government.11 9
Applying these criteria, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment
because it could not determine whether the United States set or approved reasonably
detailed design specifications for the HS-1A ejection system. 120
In Bynum v. FMC Corp. ,121 a member of the Mississippi National Guard sued
the manufacturer of an M-548 cargo carrier 122 for injuries he received when his
vehicle fell off a bridge and crashed into the creek below. 123 The trial court ruled that
the suit was barred by the government contract defense. 124 On appeal, the circuit
court declared that the government contract defense was needed to protect military
decisionmaking.125 The court also suggested that without immunity military contrac-
tors might be reluctant to bid on projects that involved new or risky technology. 126 In
addition, the court felt that it would be unfair to hold an innocent contractor liable for
a dangerous design when the government was actually responsible. 127 Finally,
according to the court, the government contract defense encouraged suppliers to work
closely with military authorities in the development and testing of equipment.128
The court then applied that the McKay formula and concluded that each of its
requirements had been met. The plaintiff was a member of the armed forces and the
accident was service-related. In addition, the M-548 was manufactured in accordance
with precise design specifications furnished by the government, and it conformed to
those specifications. Finally, the manufacturer was not aware of the risk involved in
116. Id. at 446.
117. The HS-IA system was supposed to eject a crewmember into the airstream by means of a rocket thrust. After
ejection, a drogue chute would open a larger parachute to enable the crewmember to descend to the ground safely. Id.
118. Id. at 447. The cases were consolidated for trial. Id.
119. Id. at 451.
120. Id. at 453.
121. 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985).
122. The M-548 is a tracked vehicle that is primarily used to carry ammunition for tanks and self-propelled artillery.
The specifications for the M-548 were developed by the United States Army Tank-Automatic Command (TACOM),
which was responsible for designing and testing wheeled and tracked vehicles procured by the government for military
use. The evidence showed that TACOM supplied FMC with a technical data package containing over 2500 sheets of
detailed drawings that were to be used in the manufacture of the M-548. Under the contract, FMC was obligated to comply
strictly with these design specifications in producing the M-548. Id. at 559.
123. Id. at 558.
124. Bynum v. General Motors Corp., 599 F. Supp. 155, 158 (N.D. Miss. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.
1985).
125. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1985).
126. Id. at 566.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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the product's design.129 Therefore, the court ruled that FMC was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. 130
The decedent in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.131 was killed when his
plane crashed into the Pacific Ocean shortly after taking off from an aircraft carrier.
Navy investigators concluded that the crash was probaby caused by a failure of a bolt
in the "stablizer actuation system" or "longitudinal flight control system" of the
Grumman A-6 aircraft.132 The personal representative of Shaw's estate sued
Grumman, alleging that the aircraft's design was defective because it failed to include
any warning or backup system to protect the pilot if the stablizer control failed. The
trial court applied the McKay court's formulation of the government contract defense
but found that Grumman had failed to prove its case. 133
On appeal, the circuit court declared that the purpose of the government contract
defense was to promote the separation of powers principle by protecting governmen-
tal decisions from judicial interference. 134 While acknowledging the need to screen
manufacturers from liability in certain circumstances, the court stated that the defense
should be a narrow one. 135 Under the Shaw court's approach, a manufacturer could
escape liability only by showing the following: (1) that it did not participate, or
participated only minimally, in the design of those products or parts of products
shown to be defective; or (2) that it warned the military of the design's risks and
notified it of alternative designs and that the military, although forewarned, clearly
authorized the contractor to proceed with the design anyway. 136
Applying these criteria, the court concluded that Grumman should not be
allowed to invoke the government contract defense. It found that Grumman had
exclusively designed and produced the detailed specifications for the A-6 aircraft.
Furthermore, the court noted that Grumman knew of the defect in the longitudinal
control system of the aircraft and that it failed to give an adequate warning to the
Navy about the need for a backup system. 137 Finally, the court concluded that the
Navy's formal approval for Grumman's specifications and design changes for the A-6
was not sufficiently informed to justify applying the government contract doctrine.138
Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. 39
129. Id. at 576-77.
130. Id. at 577.
131. 778 F.2d 736 (1lth Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 738. This condition had caused other crashes in the past; in order to correct it Grumman advised the Navy
to install "self-retaining bolts" in the stabilizer system. Shaw's aircraft was equipped with stabilizer bolts, but they
apparently failed to prevent the accident from happening. Id.
133. Shaw v. Grumann Aerospace Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd, 778 F.2d 736 (1Ith Cir.
1985).
134. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740 (11th Cir. 1985).
135. Id. at 741.
136. Id. at 746.
137. Id. at 747. As to the self-retaining bolts, the trial court also found that the Navy relied on Grumman's advice
that these would solve the problem. In the court's opinion, this could be interpreted as a finding by the court below that
Grumman failed to warn that the bolts would not correct the underlying defect. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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The government contract defense was also upheld in Boyle v. United Technol-
ogies Corp.t40 A Sikorsky CH-53 helicopter crashed in the ocean near Virginia
Beach. Three crewmembers got out of the aircraft through emergency exits, but the
copilot, Boyle, was unable to escape and drowned.' 4' The decedent's family brought
suit against the manufacturer, alleging that the copilot's escape hatch on the
helicopter had been improperly designed. The plaintiffs claimed that the collective,
one of the control sticks, interfered with the the copilot's access to his escape hatch
when it was pulled full up. 142
The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendant asked for a judgment
N.O.V. on the theory that the government contract defense shielded it from any
liability associated with the escape hatch's design. The trial court denied the motion
for judgment N.O.V. and the defendant appealed.' 43
The circuit court adopted the formula from the McKay decision and declared that
the manufacturer could invoke the government contract defense if it could show that:
(1) the government was immune from liability; (2) the government approved
reasonably precise specifications for the equipment; (3) the equipment conformed to
these specifications; and (4) the supplier warned the government about known
dangers inherent in the design.'"n
The court concluded that these criteria were satisfied and held that the government
contract defense was applicable. 145 The plaintiffs then petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court granted the petition 46 and pre-
sumably will rule on the validity of the government contract defense later this year.
The foregoing discussion shows that the government contract defense has
achieved widespread acceptance among the courts over the past decade.
Nevertheless, while the principle of contractor immunity is firmly established, the
courts have not yet reached a consensus about some of the government contract
doctrine's basic features. For example, the court in Agent Orange declared that a
supplier could assert a government contract defense if it proved the following: (1) the
government established the specifications for the product's design or formula; (3) the
product supplied by defendant met the government's specifications in all material
respects; and (3) the government knew as much or more about the product's inherent
risks than the defendant. 147 This expression of the government contract defense has
140. 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986).
141. Id. at 414.
142. The crash itself was caused by a malfunction in the helicopter's servo. The servo functions like power steering
to assist the pilot in operating the aircraft. The plaintiffs alleged that Sikorsky left a small chip of wire in the servo's pilot
valve when it overhauled the helicopter. According to the plaintiffs, this chip caused the servo to stop functioning. Id.
The court, however, observed that Navy personnel might have introduced the chip into the pilot valve when they worked
on the hydraulic system. Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that Sikorsky was
responsible for the malfunction of the helicopter's servo. Id. at 415-16.
143. Id. at 414.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 414-15.
146. 107 S.Ct. 872 (1987).
147. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, sub nom.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
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been adopted or cited with approval by a large number of federal and state
courts. 1
4 8
The court in McKay adopted a modified version of the Agent Orange formula
when it recognized the government contract defense. In order to avail themselves of
the government contract defense, suppliers would be required to establish the
following: (1) the United States was immune from liability as a result of the Feres
rule; (2) the government established or approved reasonably precise specifications for
the military equipment; (3) the equipment conformed to the government's specifica-
tions; and (4) the supplier warned the government about patent errors in the
specifications or about dangers involved in the use of the equipment that were known
to the supplier but not to the government. t49 This formulation has also received
considerable judicial support. 150
It is apparent that these two formulas are similar. Both require that the product
supplied to the government meet the design specifications provided by the contract.
In addition, both versions of the government contract defense require the supplier to
inform the government about inherent risks associated with the product's design.
There are, however, important differences as well. The McKay test requires proof of
governmental immunity under the Feres doctrine. The Agent Orange rule, on the
other hand, does not specifically require that governmental immunity exist. 15 '
The Agent Orange and McKay courts also disagree about the extent of
government involvement necessary to invoke the government contract defense. The
Agent Orange formula dictates that the government "establish" the specifications in
question, but the McKay court merely requires that the government "establish or
approve" the final specifications. Thus, the McKay version of the government
contract defense appears to be broader than the Agent Orange test.
The approach of the court in Shaw reflected its belief that the government
contract defense should focus on conscious risk-taking by military authorities.' 52
Accordingly, the court's formula provided that a supplier could avoid liability by
satisfying one of two conditions as follows: (1) either that it did not participate (or
participated only minimally) in the product's design; or (2) that it warned military
authorities of the dangers involved and informed them about alternative designs, and
148. E.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986); In Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Germany
on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub noma. Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106 S.Ct. 851 (1986);
Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 72 (1986);
In re All Maine. Asbestos Litig., 575 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (D. Me. 1983); Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp.
96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Mackey v. Maremont Corp., 350 Pa. Super. 415, 431, 504 A.2d 908, 915 (1986).
149. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
150. E.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d,
403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 574 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.l. Case Co., 756 F.2d
591, 597 (7th Cir. 1985); McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 211-12, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768
(1983).
151. See also Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 567 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591,
598 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985). It should be noted that the Court in Agent Orange did find the government to be immune from
suit under the Feres rule.Consequently, its failure to mention this as a condition to asserting the government contract
defense may have merely been an oversight. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 771 (E.D.N.Y.
1980), cert. denied sub nom. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
152. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 745 (1lth Cir. 1985).
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that the military authorities, though forewarned, clearly authorized the supplier to
proceed with the original design.15 3
The Shaw test, like that of Agent Orange and McKay, mandates that the product
conform to the design specifications provided by the contract. It also requires that the
government be warned of risks from the product as designed. Unlike the other
formulas, however, the Shaw approach also requires the supplier to suggest safer
alternative designs if any are available. In addition, the formula in Shaw does not
focus as much on who developed the design specifications as it does on whether
military authorities approved them with full knowledge on the inherent risks.
Moreover, Shaw, unlike McKay , does not expressly require that the government be
immune from suit.
B. Policy Considerations
Although the government contract defense has been widely accepted, some
courts and commentators have urged that it be rejected or drastically limited in its
application to products liability cases.' 54 Critics of contractor immunity believe that
the government contract defense is inconsistent with the policies that underlie the law
of products liability. On the other hand, proponents of the government contract
defense contend that these policies are not applicable to products, such as military
equipment, which are purchased by the government. In addition, they claim that other
public policies must be considered before the issue of government contractor liability
is finally resolved.
1. The Social Objectives of Strict Products Liability
Legal commentators have offered various justifications to support the imposition
of strict liability on product manufacturers as follows: (1) manufacturers impliedly
represent their products to be safe and should compensate injured consumers when
defective products cause harm; (2) strict liability encourages manufacturers to
improve product safety; (3) strict liability helps to ensure that the prices of products
will reflect their true cost to society; and (4) strict liability allows the cost of
compensating those injured by defective products to be spread among the consuming
public by means of the pricing mechanism.155
Proponents of the government contract defense, however, point out that the
defense is largely confined to government military equipment suppliers. They
maintain that there is little similarity between military equipment and consumer
153. Id. at 746.
154. E.g., McKay v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 458-61 (9th Cir. 1983) (Alarcon, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 83-84 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 357-59 (D. Kan. 1983); McLaughlin v.
Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 213, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 769-70 (1983) (Weiner, J., dissenting); Note, The
Government Contract Defense: Should Manufacturer Discretion Preclude Its Availability?, 37 ME. L. REv. 187, 187-88
(1985); Comment, supra note 15, at 718-721; Note, supra note 31, at 1048-51.
155. See generally Powers, Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict Liability, 62 N.C.L. REv. 415,
423-28 (1984).
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goods. Moreover, it is claimed that the, relationship between the government and the
supplier of military hardware is not like that of an ordinary buyer and seller.156
a. Implied Representation of Safety
Manufacturers are said to impliedly represent their products to be safe by placing
them into the stream of commerce. 157 In addition, manufacturers encourage consumer
reliance on product quality and safety through advertising and other promotional
activities. 158 Therefore, according to some commentators, the manufacturer should
compensate an injured party when its product falls short of reasonable consumer
expectations, even though the manufacturer has not been negligent. 159
In response, it is claimed that servicemen do not have the same high expecta-
tions about product safety as ordinary consumers. Instead, members of the armed
forces realize that they may encounter serious risks in the performance of their
military duties. 160 As the court in McKay declared:
[Servicemen] recognize when they join the armed forces that they may be exposed to grave
risks of danger, such as having to bail out of a disabled aircraft. This is part of the job. The
Nation sometimes demands their very lives. This is an immutable feature of their calling. To
regard them as ordinary consumers would demean and dishonor the high station in public
esteem to which, because of their exposure to danger, they are justly entitled. 16'
However, the McKay court's rhetoric is not convincing. As the dissent in McKay
observed, military personnel are honored because "they are willing to fight for their
country and risk their lives doing so," not because they are sometimes forced to use
unsafe or unsatisfactory equipment. 162 Expectations about safety on the part of
servicemen will necessarily vary according to the technological sophistication of the
156. Virtually all of the cases where the government contract doctrine has arisen have involved military equipment.
Most courts have declined to state whether the government contract defense is limited to military equipment or whether
it might be applied to other products as well. See Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 598 (7th Cir. 1985); McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Jenkins v. Whittaker
Corp., 551 F. Supp. 110 (D. Hawaii 1982); Casabianca v. Casablanca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (Sup.
Ct. 1980), afftd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981). However, at least one federal court has recognized the defense in a case where
a non-military product was produced for the government. See Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th
Cir. 1985).
157. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 343, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976); Markle v. Mulholland's,
Inc., 265 Or. 259, 266-67, 509 P.2d 529, 532-33 (1973); Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-
Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAn L. REv. 661, 688 (1974); Shapo, A Representational Theory
of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function, and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109
(1974).
158. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAN,. L. Rev. 681, 684 (1980).
159. Note, Protecting the Buyer of Used Products: Is Strict Liability for Commercial Sellers Desirable?, 33 STAN.
L. Rev., 535,544 (1981).
160. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 1986); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 572 (5th
Cir. 1983); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
However, sometimes the soldier may also be ignorant about the weapons he uses. Comment, supra note 2, at 505.
161. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983). The court in Bynum added that even if
servicemen have the same expectations of safety as ordinary consumers, these expectations should be directed toward the
government, not the military contractor, when the government is responsible for the formulation of the design
specifications in question and accepts the product once it is manufactured. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 572 (5th
Cir. 1985).
162. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 461 (9th Cir. 1983) (Alarcon, J., dissenting). See also
McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 215-16, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764,771 (1983) (Weiner, J., dissenting).
1004 [Vol. 47:985
1986] SURROGATE IMMUNITY 1005
product involved and the conditions under which it is used. For this reason, the
consumer expectation rationale retains some vitality even in the case of defective
military equipment.
b. Promotion of Product Safety
As early as 1944, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court declared that
responsibility should be fixed wherever it will effectively reduce the hazards inherent
in defective products that reach the market. 163 In most instances, manufacturers, by
virtue of their control over the production process,are in the best position to reduce
injuries from defective products.16 Strict liability forces manufacturers to internalize
the cost of product injuries, and, therefore, encourages them to discover and reduce
the risks associated with their products. 165
However, it can be argued that the product safety rationale is not applicable to
military equipment for two reasons. First, the government is not an unsophisticated
consumer; it can recognize potential safety problems and negotiate directly with the
supplier to correct them. 166 Second, the government contractor has little control over
risk exposure when the government officials dictate the product's design. 167
Consequently, the imposition of strict liability on government contractors will not
necessarily promote greater product safety. 168
In response, one can maintain that military authorities may not always be aware
of safety problems, particularly when the product's design originates with the
supplier, rather than with the government. Moreover, government contractors may be
able to influence product safety when they participate in the design process.
Therefore, in some cases, strict liability will encourage suppliers to support safety
measures, 16 9 while immunizing them will result in the production of unsafe and
unreliable equipment. 170
163. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (rraynor, J., concurring) (1944).
See also Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 208, 447 A.2d 539, 548 (1982); Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 173-74,406 A.2d 140, 151-52 (1979); Prosser, TheAssault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YAlE L.J. 1099, 1119-20 (1960).
164. Note, Products Liability and the Professional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24
HAsrNcs L.J. 111, 117 (1972).
165. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEG. SmuD. 323, 338-43 (1973); Calabresi & Hirschoff,
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060-67 (1972); Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products
Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1091 (1965); Note, Strict Liability in Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 391, 393 (1980).
166. Bynum v. RIC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 572 (5th Cir. 1983); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 704 F.2d 444,
452 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
167. Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 553 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1982); In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp 762, 793-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, sub nom. Diamond Shamrock
Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Note, supra note 4, at 1081.
168. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 572 (5th Cir. 1983); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 452
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 793
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
169. Note, supra note 154, at 207.
170. McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 215-16, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 771 (1983) (Weiner,
J., dissenting).
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c. Enterprise Liability
The concept of enterprise liability also supports the imposition of strict liability
on product manufacturers. According to this theory, the prices of goods must reflect
their true social costs if society is to achieve an efficient allocation of economic
resources. 171 Consequently, the cost of injuries should be placed on the party who
will cause this to be reflected in the price of the product. 172 Normally, the
manufacturer is in the best position to do so.
However, those who support the government contract defense maintain that the
enterprise liability rationale does not apply to military equipment. 173 First, the
enterprise liability concept reflects the belief that consumers typically underestimate
the risks involved in a product's use, and, therefore they will oyerconsume the
product unless its price reflects the true costs of accidents. 174 On ihe other hand,
military authorities, unlike civilian consumers, constantly test and evaluate the safety
and performance of the military equipment they purchase. Thus, military authorities
are normally fully aware of the risks involved with respect to military equipment. 17
The theory of enterprise liability also assumes that consumer demand for
products is elastic and will decrease as the price of the product increases. 176 In
contrast, decisions to purchase military equipment are often based on military and
political considerations and are far less affected by price. 177 As the court in McKay
observed: "Meeting adequately the needs of national defense, not accident costs, is
the ultimate standard by which purchases of military equipment must be mea-
sured.' 1 78 Consequently, the government would not necessarily choose safer
substitutes for dangerous military hardware even if the cost of such equipment was
increased to reflect the full cost of compensating injured servicemen. 179
d. Loss-Spreading
Loss-spreading is another important goal of products liability. 180 The concept of
loss-spreading assumes that liability should be placed on the party who can best
absorb and spread the cost of compensating for injuries caused by defective
171. G. CA. msi, THE Costs ot Accross 70 (1970); Klemme, The Enterprise Theory of Torts, 47 U. CoLo. L. REV.
153, 158 (1976).
172. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALu L.J. 499, 505 (1961).
173. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 571 (5th Cir. 1983); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444,
451-52 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
174. Note, supra note 159, at 537.
175. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
176. Note, supra note 159, at 537.
177. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). See
also Comment, supra note 2, at 512.
178. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
179. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 571 (5th Cir. 1983); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 452
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
180. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 31, 560 P.2d 3, 8 (1977); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251,466
P.2d 722, 726 (1970); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1962); Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 206, 447 A.2d 539, 547 (1982); Calabresi, supra note 172, at 517-27.
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products.' 8' This is generally thought to be the manufacturer. 182 The expense of
insuring or self-insuring against accident costs simply becomes another cost of
production. Moreover, since manufacturers sell to many buyers, the added cost can
be distributed in such a way that the incremental cost to each consumer is small. 83
However, proponents of the government contract defense maintain that military
suppliers cannot spread these costs through the pricing mechanism like the producers
of consumer goods because their only customer is the government. Thus, imposing
tort liability on military suppliers would ultimately cause the entire cost of
compensation to be shifted to the government. 184 In response, one might argue that
it is better for the government to bear this cost than to have it fall on individual
accident victims.18 5
The loss-spreading rationale also assumes that strict liability must be imposed on
manufacturers in order to ensure that injured consumers are compensated. However,
those who favor limiting the liability of government contractors contend that
servicemen who are injured by defective products can seek compensation directly
from the government.' 86
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see why the availability of compensation from
other sources should necessarily shield the supplier of military equipment from
liability. First, compensation under the Veterans' Benefits Act is not the economic
equivalent of a damage award in a tort action. A serviceman injured by a defectively
designed product will generally recover more in a successful lawsuit against the
product manufacturer than from the government under the Veteran's Benefits Act. 187
Furthermore, depending on how broadly the government contract defense is applied,
civilian victims of defectively designed products may be barred from suing the
supplier and yet have no statutory right to compensation from the government
either. 188
181. Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective
Products, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803, 809-10 (1976).
182. Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 Micu. L. REv. 1329, 1333
(1966); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEx. L. REv. 855, 856
(1963).
183. Note, supra note 4, at 1080.
184. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1985).
185. Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 357 (D. Kan. 1983).
186. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 452
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672-73
(1977).
187. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). In
addition, the veterans' benefits justification implicitly assumes that military personnel have somehow bargained away
protection against unsafe equipment in return for potential compensation under the Veterans' Benefits Act. As Justice
Weiner, dissenting in McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, pointed out, this argument resembles "a federal fireman's rule."
148 Cal. App. 3d 203,215, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 771 (1983). Justice Weiner doubted that there were any statutory or public
policy grounds to support the notion that servicemen bartered away their rights as consumers merely by joining the
military. Id. Furthermore, it should be noted that servicemen who are injured by manufacturing defects may sue
government contractors even though they are still eligible for compensation under the Veterans' Benefits Act. See Foster
v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1974); Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010,
1014 (5th Cir. 1969).
188. See infra notes 261-71 and accompanying text.
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2. Policies That Support the Government Contractor Defense
Courts and legal scholars have suggested a number of reasons for protecting
government contractors against tort liability. Some maintain that it would be unfair
to subject suppliers to liability when they are forced to comply with design
specifications provided by the government.1 89 Others claim that suppliers who are
held liable for design defects will pass these costs on to the government by raising
their contract prices and thus defeat the government's sovereign immunity.' 90
Proponents of the government contractor defense also contend that it is necessary to
protect military decisions from collateral attack in the courts. 191
a. Preventing Unfairness to Suppliers
Arguably, it is unfair to hold a contractor liable for design decisions made by the
government when the contractor cannot alter these decisions.t 92 This problem is
particularly acute when the supplier is compelled to manufacture the product at a
contract price which does not enable it to insure against potential liability. 193 On the
other hand, suppliers can often take steps to reduce risk and thereby lower their lia-
bility exposure. 194 In addition, since most government contracts are procured by bid
or negotiation, suppliers can usually obtain a contract price that will cover the cost of
insuring against tort liability. 195 Consequently, the fairness rationale does not appear
to justify the government contract defense except in cases where denial of immunity
would force the supplier to assume financial responsibility for the government's
decisions.
b. Limiting the Cost of Government Procurement Contracts
Those who advocate the government contract doctrine claim that contractors
would pass compensation costs on to the government, either by invoking cost-overrun
provisions in their contracts, by adjusting their bids to reflect the cost of liability
insurance, or by charging higher prices in subsequent sales of military equipment if
they are held liable for defectively designed products. 196 Each of these practices
would subvert the Feres doctrine.' 97
189. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 1985); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 504
F.Supp. 762, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, sub nom. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067
(1984); Comment, McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.: No Compulsion Required for Government Contractor
Defense, 28 ST Louis U.L.J. 1061, 1073 (1984).
190. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, sub nom. Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
191. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cit. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Shaw
v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740-41 (11th Cit. 1985).
192. Comment, supra note 189, at 1073.
193. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 793-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, sub nom.
Diamond Shamrock Chem., Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Note, supra note 9, at 191-92; Note, supra note 31, at
1049-50.
194. Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 357-58 (D. Kan. 1983); Note, supra note 4, at 1072-73.
195. Note, supra note 154, at 207.
196. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 794
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1064 (1984).
197. E.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556,565-66 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger.
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However, most contracts between the government and suppliers of military
equipment will probably reflect the cost of potential tort liability anyway. 98
Moreover, if suppliers are held liable for defective products, suppliers with good
safety records could obtain liability insurance at favorable rates and would be able to
offer lower bids than their competitors. 99 Furthermore, the cost of insurance passed
on to the government would be offset by the benefits of lower accident costs. 2°° For
this reason, the "cost pass through" rationale does not justify a rule which relieves
contractors of liability for design defects.
c. Protecting Military Autonomy
A more persuasive argument for the government contract defense is that it is
necessary to protect military autonomy. This threat to the military has been described
in various ways. For example, a number of courts have stated that holding military
contractors liable for design defects would undermine military discipline, contrary to
the Feres rule.20' Other courts have expressed concern about the willingness of
manufacturers to provide the armed forces with essential military equipment if they
were held liable for design defects. 202 Finally, the courts have suggested that allowing
suits against military contractors would "thrust the judiciary into the making of
military decisions.''203
(i) Effect on Military Discipline
Courts have traditionally upheld the power of military authorities over members
of the armed forces. As the Supreme Court observed: "[a]n army is not a deliberative
body. It is an executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left as
to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier." 20 4
Allowing servicemen to challenge the validity of military orders in civilian courts
would clearly violate this principle. 20 5 However, as the Feres court suggested,
on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. deniedsub nom. Eschlerv. Boeing Co., 106S. Ct. 851 (1984);Tillett
v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352,
354 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762,794 (E.D.N.Y.
1980), cert. denied sub nom. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Mackey v. Maremont, 350
Pa. Super. 415, 425-26, 504 A.2d 908, 913 (1986); Comment, Mckay v. Rockwell International Corp.: No Compulsion
Required for Government Contractor Defense, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1061, 1073 (1984).
198. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 n.8 (1977); Note, The Government Contract
Defense: Should Manufacturer Discretion Preclude Its Availability?, 37 ME. L. REv. 187, 205 (1985).
199. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 457 (9th Cir. 1983), (Alarcon, I., dissenting), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984).
200. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 741-42 (1lth Cir. 1985).
201. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1985); Mackey v. Maremont, 350 Pa. Super. 415, 424,
504 A.2d 908, 912 (1986).
202. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 (7th
Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
203. Bynum v. MC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 (7th
Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 72 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
204. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890).
205. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 741-42 (11th Cir. 1985).
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ordinary tort actions by servicemen against the government may also undermine
military discipline. If a serviceman on active duty was able to sue the government for
injuries sustained while carrying out military orders, civilian courts would be required
to "second-guess" the judgment of military superiors.2 6 In addition, members of the
military might be compelled to testify against their superiors or each another. This
testimony, it is feared, would have a demoralizing effect on military esprit de
corps.
20 7
Advocates of the government contract defense contend that suits by military
personnel against the suppliers of military equipment will also impair military
discipline, even though the government is not made a party to the suit.208 First, any
judicial determination that a piece of military equipment was defectively designed
would implicitly question the judgment of military authorities who authorized the
design. 209 Second, in suits against government contractors, as in suits against the
government itself, members of the armed services would be compelled to testify
about the correctness of each others' decisions and actions. 210
However, as the Shaw court pointed out, it is questionable whether a suit against
a product manufacturer would interfere with military discipline to the same extent as
a suit against the government itself since such litigation would not directly affect
military orders or practices. 211 Furthermore, testimony by servicemen about the
correctness of military decisions is likely to occur in products liability suits against
military suppliers regardless of whether the government contract defense is al-
lowed.212 Thus, the government contract defense is not essential to maintenance of
military discipline.
(ii) Providing for the National Defense
The court in McKay declared that the government was frequently required to
establish design specifications for military equipment that pushed technology to its
limits and thereby subjected servicemen to risks that would be unacceptable in
ordinary consumer products. 213 The court felt that suppliers would be reluctant to
manufacture dangerous equipment for the government, thus impairing its ability to
provide for the national defense, if they were not protected from tort liability. 21 4
Other courts have agreed that second-guessing military decisions by government
206. Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F.L. REv. 24, 42 (1976); Note, The Effect of the
Feres Doctrine on Tort Actions Against the United States by Familty Members of Servicemen, 50 FoRwtD L. REv. 1241,
1262 (1982). See also Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1232 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
207. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 741-42 (11th Cir. 1985).
208. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
209. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1986); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir.
1985).
210. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
211. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 743 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Cole v. United States, 755
F.2d 873, 879 (11th Cir. 1985)).
212. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 743 (11th Cir. 1985).
213. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
214. Id. See also Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591,
597 (7th Cir. 1985).
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contractors might limit the military's ability to make choices in the procurement
area.
215
On the other hand, potential liability for design defects would probably not
discourage manufacturers from selling military equipment to the government if they
could raise their contract prices to cover the cost of liability insurance. 216 Manufac-
turers would refuse to sell to the government only if they could not take reasonable
measures to limit their exposure to liability. 2t 7 As suggested earlier, this would
seldom happen. Therefore, the prospect of supplier resistance to military design
decisions is probably not substantial enough to justify a broad rule of immunity for
government contractors.
(iii) Protecting Military Decisions from Judicial Interference
The McKay court also stated that holding suppliers liable for design specifica-
tions provided by the government "would thrust the judiciary into the making of
military decisions." 2 1 8 One reason for this concern is that civilian courts lack
sufficient expertise to evaluate military decisions competently. 2 9 However, as the
district court pointed out in In Re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Germany,220 not
all decisions regarding the design of military equipment involve military judgments.
Where design decisions do not require special knowledge the military expertise
argument cannot justify a rule which insulates contractors from liability.2 2 '
A more appropriate concern is ensuring that the courts do not invade the
military's proper area of responsibility. 2 2 The military must be free to decide if a
particular risk is acceptable and the courts should not be allowed to independently
evaluate the merits of such decisions. 223 As the court in Agent Orange declared:
The purpose of a government contract defense.., is to permit the government to wage war
in whatever manner the government deems advisable, and to do so with the support of
suppliers of military weapons. Consideration of costs, risks to participants, risks to third
parties, and any other factors that might weigh on the decision of whether, when, and how
to use a particular weapon, are uniquely questions for the military and should be exempt
from review by civilian courts. 224
215. Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 96 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp.
351, 357 (D. Kan. 1983); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert.
denied sub nomn. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc.
2d 348, 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981); Note, supra note 9, at 187.
216. Note, supra note 4, at 1068..
217. Id.
218. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). See
also Comment, supra note 2, at 509.
219. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
220. 586 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115, cert. denied sub norm. Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106
S. Ct. 851 (1986).
221. Id. at 718.
222. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 1985).
223. Id.; Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986).
224. 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Other courts have expressed similar sentiments and agreed that the judiciary should
not be allowed to second-guess military authorities because this would violate the
separation of powers principle. 225
3. The Discretionary Function Rationale
Many courts have suggested that the government contract defense reflects the
same concerns as the Feres doctrine.2 26 As discussed earlier, the Feres doctrine bars
suits against the government by servicemen who challenge the correctness of military
orders. The government contract doctrine, on the other hand, prevents injured parties
from indirectly questioning the wisdom of governmental decisions by bringing tort
suits against the contractors who implement these decisions. To the extent that it
prevents servicemen from implicitly questioning military orders by suing military
suppliers, the government contract defense does promote the same interests as the
Feres doctrine.
Nevertheless, the governmental interest protected by the Feres doctrine does not
correspond in every respect to the interest that is protected by the government contract
defense. The Feres doctrine not only protects policymaking decisions by military
authorities, but also insulates routine, nondiscretionary decisions from judicial
scrutiny. On the other hand, the government contract doctrine is concerned with
conscious risk allocation decisions, but probably not with risks created through
negligence or mere inadvertence. For this reason, the government contract defense
appears to be more closely related to the discretionary function exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act than to the Feres doctrine.22 7 In fact, the discretionary
function rationale has already been invoked by the courts to support contractor
immunity in the public works cases,2 28 and presumably could also be used in products
liability cases. 229
By barring tort suits that challenge the planning and policymaking decision of
government officials, the discretionary function exception supports the separation of
powers principle because the ability of the judiciary to supervise the actions of the
executive branch is limited. 230 Since policy decisions may be reflected in the
225. E.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d
736, 740-41 (1lth Cir. 1985); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756
F.2d 591,597 (7th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S.
1043 (1984).
226. E.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Air Crash Diaster at Mannheim Get.
on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106 S. Ct. 851 (1984);
Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d
352, 354 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
227. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 9, 364 A.2d 43, 47 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super.
407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 66, 384 A.2d 846 (1978); Note, supra note 4,
at 1068.
228. Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965).
229. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 250 (3d. Cir. 1982); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J.
Super. 1, 9,364 A.2d 43,47 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407,381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977) (percuriam),
cert. denied, 75 N.J. 66, 384 A.2d 846 (1978); Comment, supra note 16, at 716.
230. Rogers, supra note 13, at 807. Furthermore, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1976),
provides a method for allowing the courts to review agency decisions in cases where such review is appropriate. It would
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provisions of government procurement contracts, 231 the government can presumably
rely on the discretionary function principle to bar suits against it for faulty product
design. The government contract defense bars suits against suppliers for the same
reasons that the discretionary function exception prohibits them against the govern-
ment.
If protection of government decisionmaking is the government contract de-
fense's true rationale, it is appropriate to ask whether suits against government
contractors sufficiently threaten government decisionmaking to justify such immunity
for contractors. When damages are sought against the government, the court is
required to rule on the correctness of the government officer's action, and the
government is directly sanctioned if the court concludes that the officer's conduct was
unreasonable. As a practical matter, the court tells the agency "what it should have
done, and thus, in effect, what it should do in the future. ' '232 Such conduct might
constitute an unwarranted intrusion into an area of responsibility allocated by the
Constitution to the executive branch. For this reason, it is proper to bar tort suits
against the government in the appropriate circumstances.
However, it may not be accurate to equate tort actions against government
contractors with similar suits against the government. Despite what some courts have
said, 233 products liability actions against government contractors do not ordinarily
threaten the process of government decisionmaking to the same extent as legal
proceedings against the government or its officers. Even though a court might have
to rule on the suitability of the government's design specifications when a contractor
is sued, a judgment against the contractor would not directly interfere with the
government's decisionmaking power since the government would not be bound by
the court's decision. 234 Furthermore, since the contractor, not the government, would
be forced to compensate injured parties, a judgment in the plaintiff's favor would not
necessarily act as a deterrent to future government conduct. 235
On the other hand, sometimes the relationship between government and supplier
is so close that the supplier may actually function as an instrument of the
government.3 6 In such cases, the government would be frustrated in its attempt to
effectuate essential policies if suppliers were held liable for carrying out governmen-
tal directives. 237 In addition, the government's ability to make and act upon
cost-benefit calculations would be impaired if suppliers routinely passed on the cost
be undesirable to allow parties to challenge agency decisions by means of tort actions against the government instead of
utilizing the procedures established for this purpose by Congress in the APA. Id. at 808.
231. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Comment, supra note 2, at 509.
232. Rogers, supra note 13, at 807.
233. E.g., Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1982); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United
States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965).
234. Comment, supra note 15, at 715-16.
235. Depending on the circumstances, either the Feres doctrine or the discretionary function exception would bar
suits against the government by those injured by defectively designed products. Presumably, government contractors
would not be allowed to join the government as a third party defendant either. See Henry v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.2d 1163,
1164 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Textron, Inc. v. United States, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
236. Note, supra note 9, at 221-24.
237. Comment, supra note 2, at 509.
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of damage awards to the government in the form of higher contract prices. 238 This
would be undesirable in cases where cost constraints foreclosed some choices and
forced government decisionmakers to settle for less effective alternatives. Finally, the
government might be unable to implement its policy decisions if suppliers refused to
accept contract terms that contained a high level of risk to the contractor. 239
Undoubtedly, this is what the McKay court had in mind when it expressed concern
that military suppliers would be unwilling to fulfill the government's procurement
needs, thereby frustrating national security objectives.
As mentioned earlier, these events will not occur in every case where contractors
are held liable for design decisions. Nevertheless, the prospect of interference with
governmental decisionmaking is substantial enough to support the general principle
of contractor immunity. However, any rule which limits supplier liability must be
designed to protect the government's interests, rather than the interests of its
contractors. 24o
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Although most courts have accepted the general principle of supplier immunity,
a number of issues must still be resolved before the specific dimensions of the
government contract defense are fully revealed. One question is whether suppliers of
nonmilitary products should be able to claim the protection of the government
contract defense. Another question is whether military suppliers can invoke the
government contract defense against civilian plaintiffs. There is also uncertainty
about the scope of the supplier's duty to inform the government about design risks.
In addition, the courts have disagreed over whether government participation in the
design process will defeat the government contract defense. Finally, there is no
consensus about whether state or federal law controls in cases where the government
contract defense is raised.
A. Nonmilitary Applications of the Government Contract Defense
It is not clear whether the government contract defense is limited to "military
equipment" or whether suppliers of other products purchased by the government may
also invoke its protection. Uncertainty also exists about whether supplier immunity
extends to injured civilians. If the government contract defense is grounded on the
Feres doctrine, presumably it will be limited to suits against military suppliers;
however, the government contract defense may bar suits by civilians, as well as by
military personnel, if it protects the same governmental interests as the discretionary
function exception.
238. Id. at 504.
239. Hunt v. Blasius, 55 111. App. 3d 14, 20, 370 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1977), aff'd, 74 ll.2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368.
240. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 741 (1th Cir. 1985).
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1. Nonmilitary Products
Very few courts have expressly considered whether the government contract
defense might be raised by the suppliers of nonmilitary products. Perhaps the issue
has seldom arisen because most government contract cases decided to date have
concerned military equipment24' or civilian products that have been modified to meet
specific military needs. 242 A number of courts have referred to "military equip-
ment" 243 or "military contractors, ' '244 implicitly suggesting that the government
contract defense does not extend to nonmilitary products. 245 However, others have
expresssly reserved judgment as to whether the government contract defense is
applicable to nonmilitary equipment. 246
Limiting the government contract defense to military equipment raises two
problems. First, the term "military equipment" is difficult to define. Obviously,
military weapons such as tanks, rockets, artillery, or fighter aircraft qualify as
military equipment. On the other hand, ordinary consumer goods, such as typewrit-
ers, telephones, or food products cannot be so regarded. 247 At the same time, there
are numerous products, such as motor vehicles, airplanes, clothing, and construction
equipment that are essentially civilian in nature but which have been adapted for
241. E.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986) (RF-8G reconnaissance aircraft); Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986) (CH-53 military helicopter); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778
F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985) (A-6 fighter aircraft); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985) (M-548 cargo
carrier); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub noma,
Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106 S.Ct. 851 (1984) (Chinook helicopter); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing 755
F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 72 (1986) (CH-46A military helicopter); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) (RA-5C fighter aircraft); Hubbs v. United
Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Navy SH-30 helicopter); McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal.
App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1983) (HH-3A helicopter); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d
43 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 66,
384 A.2d 846 (1978) (jeep); Mackey v. Maremont Corp., 350 Pa. Super. 415,504 A.2d 908 (1986) (M60 machine gun).
242. E.g., Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985) (front-end loader); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982) (bulldozer); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.
1980), cert. denied sub nam, Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984) (chemical herbicide);
Casabianca v. Casablanca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct 1980) aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981) (dough
mixer).
243. E.g., In re Air Crash Diaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied sub nom, Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106 S. Ct. 851 (1984) ("military equipment"); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d
591, 598 (7th Cir. 1985) ("military equipment"); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) ("military equipment"); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762,
794 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. denied sub nom, Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984) ("weapons
of war"); McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 211 n.4, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768 n.4 (1983)
("military equipment").
244. E.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1985) ("military contractors"); McLaughlin v.
Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 211, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768 (1983) ("military suppliers").
245. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984);
Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 357 (D. Kan. 1983).
246. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985) (no need to reach the question
of whether military contractor defense potentially applies to any product-a belt buckle or a can of Spam-supplied to
the military); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing, Co. 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 72 (1986) (no need to decide what form government contractor defense might take in cases which do not involve
products developed specially for the military); Casablanca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402
(Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981) (no need to consider the immunities which may attach to government
procurement for non-military purposes or at times other than time of war). See also In re All Maine Asbestos Litig., 575
F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (D. Me. 1983), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 772 F.2d 1023 (1985).
247. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) (a
"can of beans" would not be considered military equipment).
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military use. While the courts have usually characterized these products as mili-
tary,248 the line is sometimes hard to draw.
A more serious objection to restricting the government contract defense to
military equipment is that such a limitation would be inconsistent with the doctrine's
underlying rationale. It was suggested earlier that the government contract defense,
like the discretionary function exception, is not just concerned with military
procurement decisons, but protects governmental decisionmaking generally. If this
proposition is correct, the government contract defense should not be limited to
military equipment but should include any design choice that involves an exercise of
government discretion. 249
A few courts have already applied the government contract defense to nonmil-
itary products. For example, the defense was raised in Price v. Tempo, Inc.,250 a suit
by a fireman against the manufacturers of firefighting equipment. The plaintiff
alleged that his firefighting gloves and coat did not provide adequate protection
against exposure to heat and flames.2s5 Both manufacturers invoked the government
contract defense, contending that their products conformed to specifications estab-
lished by the City of Philadelphia. 25 2 The court adopted the Agent Orange
formulation and granted a partial summary judgment to one of the manufacturers. 25 3
The plaintiff argued that the policies behind the government contract defense were
only applicable to contracts for military equipment. The court, however, concluded
that the defense was based on broader considerations of sovereign immunity and,
therefore, should not be limited to contractors who supplied goods to the armed
forces .254
The manufacturer of a cattle vaccine successfully invoked the government
contract defense as well. In Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co.,25s the plaintiff, a
veterinarian, was injured when he was accidentally injected with brucellosis vaccine
distributed by the defendant, Colorado Serum Company. The vaccine was manufac-
tured pursuant to a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture for use in the
National Brucellosis Eradication Program. 256 The federal government had developed
the vaccine and the contract provided detailed specifications for its manufacture and
248. See supra note 242.
249. Examples might include vans for the Postal Service, helicopters for the Coast Guard, or off-road vehicles for
the National Park Service.
250. 603 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
251. The gloves were manufactured by Tempo, Inc.. The plaintiff claimed that the gloves should have been
constructed with a vapor barrier and wool lining. The coat was manufactured by Alv, Inc.. The plaintiff alleged that the
coat should have been lined with fire-retardant material. Id. at 1360.
252. Id.
253. The court found that the coat conformed to the contract specifications and that the manufacturer had not
participated in the development of these specifications. However, the court still required the manufacturer of the coat to
establish at trial that the city knew as much about the risks associated with the product's design as it did. Id. at 1363-64.
The glove manufacturer's motion for summary judgment was denied because it failed to establish any of the Agent Orange
requirements. Id. at 1363.
254. Id. at 1361 n.3.
255. 772 F.2d 844 (1lth Cir. 1985).
256. Brucellosis is an incurable disease which causes abortions in cattle. The U.S. Government began using
brucellosis vaccine in 1941. Accidental injection of the vaccine into humans can cause undulant fever or human
brucellosis. Symptoms include fever, aches, pains, chills, weight loss, and fatigue. Id. at 845.
1016 [Vol. 47:985
1986] SURROGATE IMMUNITY 1017
production. The contract also provided the exact language to be printed on the label
of the vaccine.2 s7
The plaintiff brought suit against Colorado Serum Company, alleging that the
labeling on the vaccine's package was inadequate because it did not give proper
warning about the vaccine's danger to humans. The manufacturer obtained a
summary judgment from the trial court on the theory that the government contract
doctrine barred the plaintiff's claim. 58
On appeal, the federal circuit court ruled that the contractor would not be held
liable when the government was immune from suit. The Burgess court declared:
Both the history of the defense and its general rationale lead us to the conclusion that it
would be illogical to limit the availability of the defense solely to "military" contractors. If
a contractor has acted in the sovereign's stead and can prove the elements of the defense,
then he should not be denied the extension of sovereign immunity that is the government
contract defense.259
The court then concluded that the defendant had established each of the elements of
the government contract defense under the Agent Orange formula and affined the
decision of the trial court.260
The Burgess decision is correct insofar as it holds that the government contract
defense is not restricted to military equipment. The governmental interest in
protecting its policy choices from judicial scrutiny extends beyond the military arena.
2. Civilian Victims
A related issue is whether the government contract defense can be asserted
against civilian victims. A negative answer to this question is dictated by the McKay
formula. 261 One requirement under McKay is that the government be immune from
suit under the Feres doctrine. 262 Because the Feres rule only applies to service-related
injuries it would not necessarily act as a bar to nonderivative civilian claims. 263
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 846.
260. Id. at 847.
261. See also Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985). When it recognized the government contract
defense, the Bynum court felt that it was necessary to distinguish Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036,
1044-45 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985), an asbestos case from the fifth circuit that had refused to
apply the doctrine. According to the Bynum court, Hansen was distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case was a
civilian and, therefore, the federal interest in military discipline was not implicated. 770 F.2d at 573. The government
contract defense has been rejected in other asbestos cases as well. However, the usual reason given for refusing to apply
the doctrine is that the risks associated with exposure to asbestos were inherent in the nature of the product itself and not
attributable to any conduct by the government. Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 67 Hawaii 157, 683 P.2d 389, 392
(1984). See also In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
262. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
263. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). Derivative claims by family members of service personnel
are likewise barred by the Feres doctrine. See De Font v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239, 1240 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 910 (1972); Shaw v. United States, 448 F.2d 1240, 1241-42 (4th Cir. 1971); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. denied sub nom, Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 465 U.S. 1067
(1984) (claims of children for birth defects and gentic damage due to parents' exposure to Agent Orange barred by Feres
doctrine). See also Note, supra note 206, at 1244-45. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has refused to extend the
Feres doctrine to military-related injuries of civilians. See Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 197
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The government contract defense was rejected in part for this reason in Johnston
v. United States,2 64 which contained claims against the manufacturers of aircraft
instruments. The plaintiffs were employees of a company that repaired aircraft
instruments. They claimed to have developed cancer as a result of exposure to
radioactive compounds on the faces of many of the aircraft instruments sent to them
for repair.265 The manufacturers contended that these instruments were produced
under wartime contracts with the United States government and that any injury-
producing aspects of the products were mandated by contract specifications.
Accordingly, they moved for summary judgment.2 66 However, the court concluded
that the government contract defense was not applicable. In the court's view, it was
not necessary to vindicate the policies behind the governmental immunity established
in Feres because the injured parties were not servicemen. 267 Therefore, the court
refused to grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment.268
Casabianca v. Casabianca,269 on the other hand, supports the view that the
government contract doctrine can act as a bar to liability for civilian injuries. The
plaintiff a young boy, was injured by a defective dough mixer that had been
manufactured by the defendant for the Army during World War 11.270 The court
dismissed the case against the manufacturer, declaring that a supplier should not be
held liable as long as it followed the government's specifications. The court
suggested that withholding immunity from government contractors would cause them
to second-guess military decisions, a result the court regarded as contrary to public
policy. 271 The court apparently went beyond the confines of the Feres doctrine to
reach this conclusion.
Other courts have also permitted a manufacturer to invoke the government
contract defense against civilian plaintiffs. For example, both Price and Burgess,
discussed earlier, were not only concerned with nonmilitary equipment, but also
involved civilian plaintiffs. In each case, the court allowed the defense to be asserted
against civilians.
Courts that have tied the government contract defense to the Feres doctrine have
limited it to military litigants. However, if the government contract defense is based
n.8 (1983) (government potentially liable to manufacturer in indemnity action for damages paid to civilian killed in crash
of military aircraft in Vietnam).
264. 568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983).
265. Id. at 353.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 358.
268. Id. at 360. It should be noted that the court in Johnston did not refuse to apply the government contract defense
simply because the plaintiffs were civilians; rather, it evaluated each McKay criterion and either rejected it outright or
found that it did not apply to the facts of the case. Thus, the court found that there was no danger of second-guessing
military decisions and rejected the notion that the contractor would pass additional costs on to the government. The court
also concluded that manufacturers would not be treated unfairly if they were required to compensate those who were
injured by their defectively designed products. Id. at 357-58.
Significantly, the court suggested that policy behind the discretionary function exception might justify recognition
of the government contract defense in some instances but observed that no discretionary function appeared to be involved
in the decision to use radium dials in aircraft instruments. Id. at 358.
269. 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981).
270. Id. at 349, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
271. Id. at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
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on the same rationale as the discretionary function exception, it should be applied to
civilian as well as military plaintiffs.
B. Supplier Participation in the Design Process
Another hotly disputed issue is whether involvement by the supplier in the
formulation of design specification should prevent it from raising the government
contract defense. Of course, the supplier's role in the development of contract
specifications varies according to the nature of the procurement process. In some
cases, the government establishes detailed design specifications without any signifi-
cant input from the suppliers. 272 In other instances, both the government and the
supplier contribute to the product's final design. 273 However sometimes the govern-
ment merely sets performance criteria and delegates responsibility for the product's
ultimate design to the supplier.274
One would assume that the case for immunity under the government contract
defense becomes less persuasive as the level of supplier involvement in the design
process increases. Nevertheless, the courts apparently have not agreed on where to
draw the line.
1. Design Specifications Developed by the Government
There is no participation by the supplier in the product's design when the
government develops design criteria on its own and incorporates them in nonnego-
tiable contract specifications. In such cases, government officials, not the supplier,
are responsible for any design risk. Consequently, it is not surprising that the courts
have uniformly allowed the supplier to claim immunity under the government
contract defense.
Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that suppliers should not be
allowed to assert the government contract defense unless the government "compels"
them to follow the contract specifications exactly.275 In its most extreme version, this
compulsion requirement would limit the government contract defense to situations
where the supplier is legally obligated to enter into a contract with the government. 276
272. E.g., Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 845 (1lth Cir. 1985); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d
556, 559 (5th Cir. 1985); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1274 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), cert.
denied sub nom, Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J.
Super. 1, 3-4, 364 A.2d 43, 44 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978); Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 349, 428
N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981); Mackey v. Maremont, 350 Pa. Super. 415,419, 504
A.2d 908, 910 (1986).
273. E.g., In re Air Crash Diaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115, 118 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied
sub nom, Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106 S.Ct. 851 (1986); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 1985);
Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 72 (1986);
Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 256 (3d Cir. 1982).
274. E.g., Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 747 (1lth Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 704 F.2d 444, (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
275. Comment, supra note 15, at 715-16.
276. Congress has given the President considerable power over private enterprises in time of war or national
emergency. See Katayma, Emergency Procurement Powers, 2 PUB. Cor. L.J. 236 (1969). For example, the Defense
Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-269 (1976), permits the President to compel contractors to accept and
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The plaintiff in Bynum v. FMC Corp. 2 7 7 argued for such a rule, 278 but the court
concluded that it would discourage contractors from bidding on government projects
or cause them to pressure the government into purchasing safer equipment. In either
event, according to the court, the contractor would be thrust into the position of
second-guessing military decisions.27 9 Therefore, the court rejected the proposed
compulsion rule. 280
A more conventional form of compulsion rule would limit the government
contract defense to situations where the contract is offered to the supplier on a "take
it or leave it" basis. According to this theory, a supplier would not be able to raise
the government contract defense unless all contract specifications originate with the
government and the supplier has no power to negotiate contract terms or to deviate
from them once it accepts the contract. However, this variation of the compulsion
rule has not found favor with the courts either.
For example, in Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.281 the plaintiff urged the court
to reject the government contract defense unless the manufacturer showed that it was
compelled by the government to comply with the specifications responsible for
causing the injuries. 28 2 The manufacturer, on the other hand, claimed that compulsion
played no part in the government contract defense and that it was obligated to do
nothing more than strictly comply with the design specifications. 283 The court agreed
with the defendant's position and held that compulsion was not required under
Pennsylvania law. 284
The Bynum and Brown courts were correct in ruling that compulsion should not
be a necessary predicate to the government contract defense. When the supplier has
no role in the formulation of a product's design, one can properly attribute sole
responsibility for the design to the government. If the government makes a conscious
decision to accept a risk when it chooses a particular design, the government contract
doctrine should be available to insulate that decision from judical review. However,
this does not necessarily mean that the defense should be limited to such situations.
In some cases, it may be appropriate to protect product design decisions, even though
perform contracts when necessary to promote the national defense. 50 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1976). Other statutes allow the
President to order production during wartime or to take over possession of any plant whose owners refuse to supply the
required goods at a reasonable price. 10 U.S.C. §§ 4501, 9501 (1976).
277. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985).
278. Id. at 574.
279. Id. at 574-75.
280. The Bynum court, however, did not determine whether the government contract defense would only be
available in cases where the defendant was required by the terms of the contract to follow the government's specificaons.
Instead, it merely noted that FMC had no discretion to deviate from the design specifications provided by the government,
although the manufacturer could suggest modifications. Id. at 575 n.25.
281. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982).
282. Id. at 246.
283. Id. at 253.
284. Id. at 254. However, the court then concluded that a question of fact was presented as to whether the
manufacturer had strictly complied with the specifications of its contract with the Army. Observing that the contract was
"a veritable tome of technical specifications, bidding notices, and communications between the government and
Caterpillar," the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the contract clearly did not contemplate the
addition of a protective structure on the bulldozer. Id. at 256. Accordingly, it reversed the summary judgment and
remanded the case to the district court for trial on that issue. Id. at 257.
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others have participated in the design process, as long as the government makes the
final decision.
2. Specifications Developed by the Supplier and the Government
Generally, the courts have allowed suppliers to raise the government contract
defense even when the contract specifications did not originate entirely with the
government. For example, in Agent Orange,2 5 the plaintiffs contended that any role
by the defendant manufacturer in preparation of the specifications, including advice
or recommendations to the government about product design, should defeat the
government contract defense. The court, however, rejected this argument and ruled
that a manufacturer could assert the defense as long as the product it supplied was the
particular product specified by the government. 286
Sometimes, the government officials and suppliers may engage in a "back and
forth" process of negotiation over the contract specifications. When this occurs, it is
difficult to ascertain whether a particular design specification originated with the
government or with the supplier. In such cases, both parties usually bear some
responsibility for the product's ultimate design. Nevertheless, some courts have
allowed the supplier to invoke the government contract defense in these circum-
stances as long as the government plays a significant role in the development of the
specifications. 287
For example, in Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Division of Boeing Co.,288 the
decedent was killed when his Navy helicopter crashed during a training flight. Suit
was brought against Boeing, the aircraft's manufacturer. The trial court ruled that
Boeing must prove that the government "established" the specifications for the
helicopter in order to invoke the government contract defense.289 The court then
found that the Navy had established detailed safety features and had inspected each
helicopter to ensure that it complied with contract specifications. 290 Consequently,
the trial court concluded that the government contract defense was applicable and
granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 291
285. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied sub nom,
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
286. Id. at 1056. See also Note, supra note 154, at 192. The court, however, also suggested that it was necessary
that the government establish contract specifications for the product, and that mere ratification or approval of
specifications provided by the manufacturer might not be enough to immunize the supplier from tort liability. In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y 1982). See also Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
778 F.2d 736, 744 (11th Cir. 1985).
287. E.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414-15 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Mannheim Ger. on 9111182, 769 F.2d 115, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, sub noma, Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106
S.Ct. 851 (1984); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 72 (1986); Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
288. 553 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
289. Id. at 343.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 344.
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On appeal, the circuit court agreed that the manufacturer could invoke the
government contract defense. 292 Even though some of the specifications originated
with Boeing, the court found that these proposals simply initiated a "back and forth"
discussion between Boeing and the Navy, with the Navy making all final decisions
as to the helicopter's specifications.2 93 The court felt that a rule which allowed any
involvement by the contractor in the design process to defeat the government contract
defense would discourage suppliers from working closely with the military. Conse-
quently, the court concluded that government "approval" of specifications devel-
oped through a continuous series of negotiations between the government and the
supplier would satisfy the requirements of the government contract defense, even
though some of these specifications originated with the contractor. 294
The Koutsoubos approach was also followed in In Re Air Crash Diaster at
Mannheim Germany.295 The case concerned the crash of an Army CH-47C
"Chinook" helicopter in which 46 persons were killed. The accident was apparently
caused by a defect in the design of the aircraft's synchronization system.296 A number
of suits were brought against the manufacturer and consolidated before a single court
for purposes of determining the liability issue. 297
Boeing had developed the aircraft's design in response to Army mission and
performance requirements. The Army then approved the design, inspected proto-
types, implemented design changes, and approved the design for production. 298 After
several accidents occured, which indicated flaws in the design of the forward
transmission system, Boeing suggested a number of design changes; however, the
Army rejected a proposed change that would have prevented the accident. 299
At trial, the district court ruled that the government contract defense was
inapplicable because Boeing had initially developed the helicopter's design based on
the Army's performance specifications. 300 Accordingly, it refused to overturn a jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. 301 However, this view of the government contract
defense was rejected on appeal. The appellate court observed that the contract
between Boeing and the Army set forth explicit specifications for the design of the
transmission and synchronization shaft. The court also found that the Army had
292. Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct.
72 (1986).
293. Id. at 354.
294. Id. at 355.
295. 769 F.2d 115, 123 (3d Cir. 1985).
296. In re Air Crash Diaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11182, 586 F. Supp. 711,715 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d
115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom, Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106 S.Ct. 851 (1986). Failure of the forward
transmission caused displacement of the pinion gear. This, in turn, allowed the sychronization shaft to rub against the
aircraft's structure, weakening the synchronization shaft and causing the shaft to rupture when power was applied to the
transmission. In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11/82. 769 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub
nom, Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106 S.Ct 851 (1984).
297. In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11/82, 575 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1983), motion denied 586
F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Esehler v. Boeing Co., 106
S.Ct. 851 (1986).
298. In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11/82, 586 F. Supp. at 711, 715-16 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
299. In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115, 118-19 (3d Cir. 1985).
300. In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11/82, 586 F. Supp. 711, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
301. Id. at 721.
1022 [Vol. 47:985
SURROGATE IMMUNITY
extensively tested prototype aircraft and required design changes before it allowed
Boeing to start production of the helicopters. 30 2 Therefore, in the court's view, the
government's participation in the design process and its exercise of final
decisionmaking authority was sufficient to meet the "approval" requirement of
Koutsoubos.303
The court in Tozer v. LTV304 also allowed the government contract defense to be
invoked where the government and the supplier jointly developed a product's design.
The decedent in Tozer was killed in a plane crash near the coast of California. The
crash occurred when a panel, known as the "Buick Hood," came off in mid-flight,
causing the pilot to lose control of a Navy RF-8G reconnaissance plane. 30 5 Suit based
on negligence and strict liability was brought against the manufacturer, alleging that
the panel was defectively designed. The trial court refused to overturn a jury verdict
for the plaintiff and the manufacturer appealed. 30
6
The appellate court found that the manufacturer, Vought, had worked closely
with the Navy in developing the specifications for the aircraft. Nevertheless, it
concluded that the government contract defense was still applicable. The court
acknowledged that contractor participation in design was essential to the development
of modem weapons. As the court declared:
The contractor and the military pool their expertise, matching the latest advances in military
technology with the specific dictates of the mission. We recognize this back-and-forth as a
reality of the procurement process, as well as a valuable part of that process; indeed if
military technology is to continue to incorporate the advances of science, it needs the
uninhibited assistance of private contractors. 307
In the court's opinion, a restrictive application of the government contract defense
would discourage contractors from working with military authorities to design
military hardware. 30 8 Therefore, the court held that the defense would be allowed as
long as there was "genuine governmental participation in the design .. ,"309
The court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.310 also concluded that "back
and forth" discussions between the manufacturer and the government would satisfy
the approval requirement. Boyle was concerned with the design of an escape hatch for
the Sikorsky CH-53 helicopter. The court observed that Sikorsky and the Navy had
worked together to prepare the detailed specifications for the aircraft. In addition,
Sikorsky built a mockup of the cockpit with all the instruments and controls,
including the emergency escape hatch. This, in the court's opinion, was sufficient to
302. In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Germany on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115, 118-19 (3d Cir. 1985).
303. Id. at 123.
304. 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986).
305. Id. at 404.
306. The trial court instructed the jury that the government contract doctrine precluded liability under a theory of
strict products liability, but failed to give a similar instruction with respect to the negligence count. The defendant claimed
that the government contract defense could be raised in a negligence action as well as one based on strict liability. Id. at
405. The circuit court agreed with the defendant. Id. at 408-09.
307. Id. at 407.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 408.
310. 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986).
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establish that the Navy had approved reasonably detailed specifications for the
allegedly defective escape hatch. 3 "
Agent Orange, Koutsobous, In Re Air Crash Disaster, Tozer, and Boyle
correctly concluded that participation by the supplier in the formulation of a product's
design should not necessarily defeat the government contract defense. If the purpose
of the defense is to protect discretionary descisions by government officials, then
courts in products liability suits should focus on whether the supplier or the
government was primarily responsible for the decision to go forward with a particular
design when the inherent risks were known. A formula that focuses on the origin of
a design specification, rather than the source of the decision to adopt the design,
misses the point.
3. Specifications Developed Solely by the Supplier
It is more difficult to justify contractor immunity when the supplier is the sole
source of a defective design than when the government has played a significant role
in the design's development. Nevertheless, the court in McKay v. Rockwell
International Corp.,312 held that the government contract defense could be invoked
even when the supplier alone developed the product's design. Although the court
stated that the defense would not be allowed when the government set only minimal
or very general requirements for the contractor, it was apparently willing to recognize
the government contract defense in situations where the contractor alone developed
the specifications as long as the government reviewed and approved a detailed set of
specifications. 313
However, this view of the government contract defense provoked sharp criticism
from one member of the McKay court.314 Judge Alarcon, dissenting in McKay,
argued that the government contract defense should not apply in cases where the
manufacturer produced the design in question, even when the government subse-
quently ratified the manufacturer's decision. 315 The dissent felt that contractors who
designed a product should be responsible for any defects in their design and that mere
ratification by the government should not be enough to immunize them from
liability. 316
Nevertheless, the holding in McKay is not necessarily inconsistent with the
policies that underlie the government contract defense. As long as government
officials have made a meaningful decision to approve a particular product design, it
should not matter that the design originated entirely with the supplier as long as
311. Id. at 414-15.
312. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046 (1984).
313. Id. at 450. See also Note, supra note 9, at 200-01.
314. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 456-64 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
See also Note, The Government Contractor Defense and Manufacturers of Military Equipment, 21 Hous. L. Rev. 855,
870-71 (1984); Note, supra note 154, at 195-96. Comment, supra note 15, at 717. but see Comment, supra note 189,
at 1082.
315. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
316. Id.
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government decisionmakers were fully aware of the risks involved in a particular
design choice.
4. The Shaw Court's Approach
The formula employed by the court in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.317
provides another approach to the question of supplier participation in the design
process. First, the court cautioned against placing too much emphasis on "specifi-
cations" as a touchstone of liability. As the court observed:
Specifications may be minimal or detailed, quantitive or qualitative, general or specific; they
may range from meticulous descriptions of each bearing and bushing required, to vague
hopes for "simple" or "fail-safe" products. At times, several sets of specifications,
sometimes conflicting, may govern a product's design all at once: e.g., one "spec"
requiring back-up or redundancy systems in all products, another urging ease of mainte-
nance, a third mandating combat effectiveness, a forth seeking cost containment, and a fifth
prescribing the dimensions of a washer. Worse still, these specifications may be promul-
gated by several different sources, military or civilian, at different times over the life of a
product.318
Instead, the Shaw court looked at specifications as a starting point, rather than as a
sole criterion, for determining whether the government contract defense was
applicable to a case or not. According to the court, specifications could be divided
into two types as follows: (1) detailed, precise, and typically quantitative specifica-
tions for manufacture of a particular military product; and (2) more general and more
qualitative specifications, such as performance or mission criteria. This second
category would encompass all product specifications not included in the first
category. 319
The court concluded that if a type one design was generated exclusively by the
military, the product manufacturer would only be held liable for manufacturing
defects. Furthermore, a military contractor who worked jointly with military
personnel in producing type one product specifications, could escape liability if it
could show that the part it played was so minimal that liability should not be
warranted. 320
However, the Shaw court determined that a manufacturer could also invoke the
government contract defense in some cases where type two specifications were
involved. According to the court, the manufacturer could avoid liability by showing
that it warned the military of the reasonably known risks of the design, notified the
government of alternative designs, and that the military, although forewarned, clearly
authorized the contractor to proceed with the more dangerous design. 32' The court,
however, insisted that authorization be "knowing" and that a mere "rubber stamp"
approval would not be sufficient. In addition, the court ruled that the approval must
317. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985).
318. Id. at 745.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 746.
321. Id.
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be obviously related and responsive to the relevant warning. According to the Shaw
court, the overriding objective of this test was to determine whether or not a military
judgment to go ahead with the dangerous design was actually made. 3'2 The Shaw
court's formula provides a useful analytical tool to determine whether a particular
design decision implements governmental policy or merely represents government
acquiescence to the supplier's decision.
C. The Duty to Warn
Most courts have conditioned the government contract defense on full disclosure
of all known risks.32 3 This disclosure requirement presumably provides suppliers with
an incentive to work closely with military authorities in the development and testing
of equipment. 324 In addition, a supplier who has fully informed the government about
the potential risks of a proposed design can assume that the government has made a
conscious decision to accept these risks when it adheres to the design. 325
Although the courts agree that a duty to warn exists, they differ about the scope
of this duty. Most courts subscribe to an "actual knowledge" standard -which merely
obligates the supplier to disclose known risks.326 However, some courts have adopted
a "should have known" standard which requires the supplier to disclose all risks
associated with the product's design which it either knew or should have known
about. 327
Agent Orange328 was the first case to examine the nature of the supplier's
obligation to inform the government about design risks. The defendant in that case
maintained that its knowledge of the risk, in the absence of a glaring or patent hazard
in the specifications, was irrelevant to the existence of a government contract
defense. 329 However, the court declared that a supplier should not be insulated from
liability when an adequate warning would have prevented the harm. Consequently,
the court held that the manufacturer was required to disclose known risks associated
with any product that it supplied so that the military could properly balance the
322. Id.
323. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736,746 (1lth Cir. 1985).
324. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591,
597 (7th Cir. 1985).
325. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). It is not clear whether a
supplier who fully informs the government about a particular risk that could be eliminated by changing the product's
design is thereby also relieved of any duty to wam the ultimate user or consumer. Compare Mackey v. Maremont Corp.,
350 Pa. Super. 415, 431, 504 A.2d 906, 916 (1986) (manufacturer can rely on government to instruct users on safe
operation of M60 machine gun), with Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 741 F.2d 656, 660 (3d Cir. 1984) (duty to wam
runs to the ultimate consumer and knowledge of employer is not imputed to employee user).
326. E.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 415 (4th Cir. 1986); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770
F.2d 556, 575 -76 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.l. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing
Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
327. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (1Ith Cir. 1985); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 849 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
328. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
329. Id. at 1057.
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product's risks and benefits. 330 At the same time, the court cautioned that the supplier
was not required to conduct any testing that was not included in the contract
specifications. 331
However, at a subsequent stage in the Agent Orange litigation, the court shifted
to a "should have known" formula. 332 The court explained that this new approach
was meant to discourage suppliers from deliberately remaining ignorant about the
dangers of their products. 333 The court acknowledged that this departure from its
previously announced standard was influenced by the peculiar facts of the Agent
Orange case. Specifically, the court felt that a "should have known" standard was
more appropriate than an actual knowledge standard because the components of
Agent Orange had long been used as herbicides in the civilian market. 334
The court in Shaw335 also adopted a "should have known" test. According to
Shaw, when detailed specifications were not provided by the government, the
contractor should be required to demonstrate that it warned the military of the risks
of the product and that it informed the government of any design alternatives
"reasonably known" to it.336 The court emphasized that reasonable knowledge did
not mean omniscience. Rather, an alternative would be considered to be reasonably
known only if it was either actually known or if it reasonably should have been known
according to good design practice in the industry. 337
Despite the holdings in Agent Orange and Shaw, most courts still adhere to the
"actual knowledge" standard. 338 For example, in Bynum, the plaintiff urged
the court to adopt a "should have known" standard, arguing that it would increase
the information flow between the military contractor and the government and allow
the government to make better informed decisions. 339 The court, however, declared
that a "should have known" standard would compel the military contractor to
reevaluate the design specifications furnished by the government and engage in
testing not required under the government contract. The court believed that decisions
about testing were best left to the military. 340
330. Id. at 1055.
331. Id.
332. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 849 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
333. Id.
334. Id. The court pointed out that the "should have known" standard does not apply to the government, holding
instead that actual knowledge on the government's part is required in order to relieve the supplier of its duty to infonn
about design risks. According to the court, if the government was not aware of the danger, a manufacturer could not
assume that the government made a conscious decison to accept the particular risk. In addition, the fact that the
government may have been derelict in its duty should not relieve a defendant from the consequences of its own tortious
conduct. Finally, in the court's opinion, an inquiry into what the military should have known or done could come
perilously close to the second-guessing of military decisions prohibited by the Feres-Stencel doctrine. Id. at 850.
335. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985).
336. Id. at 746.
337. Id.
338. E.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 575-76 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591,
599 (7th Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 72 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984).
339. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 575 (5th Cir. 1985).
340. Id. at 576. The court also acknowledged that the court in Agent Orange had modified its earlier version of the
government contract defense to incorporate a limited "known or should have known" duty to warn. However, it
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The duty to warn ensures that government officials will be able to make policy
decisions on an informed basis. Therefore, the imposition of this requirement on
suppliers is consistent with the rationale behind the government contract defense.
Obviously, the duty to inform should include all risks actually known to the supplier.
In addition, it is reasonable to impute knowledge to the supplier of risks which are
commonly known within the industry. A supplier who fails to become aware of a risk
because of negligence should not be allowed to invoke the government contract
defense. To do so would not promote informed decisionmaking by the government,
but instead would merely reward contractors who remained culpably ignorant of the
risks associated with their products. On the other hand, the supplier should not be
required to conduct any testing beyond that which is required by the contract.
Otherwise, the supplier would be forced to substitute its judgment for that of the
government as to what constituted adequate testing.
D. The Government Contract Defense and Federal Common Law
Another area of uncertainty is whether the government contract doctrine should
be treated as a creature of state law or whether it should be regarded as an aspect of
federal common law. Federal courts have uniformly applied federal admiralty law to
litigants who have sued under the Death on the High Seas Act. 34 1 However, when
injured parties have sought relief in federal court on diversity grounds, some courts
have followed state law, 34 2 but others have applied federal common law.343
Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.344 was the first case to address the choice-of-
law issue explicitly. In Brown, the manufacturer, Caterpillar, argued that the Feres
doctrine required federal law to be applied. 345 The court, however, responded that the
Feres and Stencel Aero decisions did not support the application of federal law in
suits by servicemen against government contractors. Instead, the court observed that
manufacturers who served a national market were often subjected to varying
standards of liability in different jurisdictions. The court also concluded that suits by
concluded that the Agent Orange court had limited its ruling to situations where the manufacturer had years of experience
with components of the product before it was manufactured by the military and that the product was highly technical in
nature. In Bynum, the product was designed by TACOM, a division of the Army, well versed in the design of and the
problems inherent in tracked military vehicles. Consequently, the court concluded that the factors that prompted the
modification of the Agent Orange test were not present. Id. at 576, n.29.
341. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1976). See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 404 (4th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 738 (11 th Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352,
353 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 72 (1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
342. E.g., Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1985) (Alabama law applied); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Eschler v. Boeing
Co., 106 S.Ct. 851 (1986) (Pennsylvania law applied); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1985)
(WVisconsin law applied); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 1982) (Pennsylvania law applied);
in re All Maine Asbestos Litig., 575 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (D. Me. 1983) aff'd in part denied in part, 772 F.2d 1023
(1985) (Maine law applied); Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359, 1360-61 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (Pennsylvania law
applied).
343. E.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 574 (5th Cir. 1985); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. 597
F. Supp. 740, 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See also McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 211-12, 195
Cal. Rptr. 764, 768 (1983).
344. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982).
345. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
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servicemen against government contractors did not circumvent the limitations on
governmental liability contained in the Veterans' Benefits Act. Furthermore, the
court maintained that suits against government contractors would not require
second-guessing of military decisions by the judiciary and, therefore, did not pose as
much of a threat to military discipline as suits against the government itself.346
Consequently, the court ruled that state law, not federal law, should control.
The Agent Orange court reached a different conclusion. The court stated that
regardless of the law applied to other substantive issues, the supremacy clause
required that federal law be applied to affirmative defenses in some circumstances. 347
To determine whether federal law applied to a claim or defense, the court utilized an
approach derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Clearfield Trust v. United
States.34s The Clearfield Trust test requires a court to determine the following: (1)
whether there exists a substantial federal interest in the outcome of the issue; (2) what
the effect on this federal interest would be if state law was applied; and (3) what the
effect on state interests would be if state law were displaced by federal common
law.34 9 Federal law will usually prevail if a substantial federal interest is involved and
this interest would be adversely affected if state law is chosen. Federal law is
particularly appropriate if no substantial state interest is impaired by the displacement
346. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1982).
347. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
348. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). The Court concluded that federal common law governed the rights and duties of the
federal government in connection with the commercial paper it issued. The Court's approach required a finding that a
source of authority for the creation of federal law existed and that a federal interest was sufficiently implicated to justify
the subsitution of federal law for state law. Id. at 366-67. See also Note, Tort Remedies for Servicemen Injured by
Military Equipment: A Case for Federal Common Law, 55 N.Y.U.L. REv. 601, 609-611 (1980). In Miree v. DeKalb
County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), and Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966), the Court extended the
Clearfield approach to cases where the federal government was not a defendant. The district court in Agent Orange
expressly relied on these decisions as the basis for its three-part test.
It should be noted that the applicability of federal common law was also addressed from the jurisdictional viewpoint
by the Agent Orange court in an earlier opinion. The plaintiffs in Agent Orange originally based their claims under federal
common law, claiming that the court had subject matter jurisdiction because of the existence of a federal question. The
plaintiffs argued that federal common law should be applied because of the unique relationship between the government
and its servicemen and because of the overriding federal interests involved in the Agent Orange controversy. In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737, 744-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Diamond Shamrock
Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
The court declared that the choice of law issue was governed by Miree v. Dekalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), and
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966). In these cases, the United States Supreme Court
formulated a test to determine whether federal common law would be employed. Under this approach, the court was
required to establish that there was a substantial federal interest in the outcome of the litigation. If such an interest was
found, the court was then supposed to consider the effect on this federal interest if state law was applied, as well as the
effect on state interests if state law was displaced by federal common law. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
506 F.Supp. 737, 744-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Applying this test, the court concluded that substantial federal interests were
involved in the litigation and that such intersts would be adversely affected by the application of state law. Id. at 746.
On appeal, the circuit court recognized that the approach followed in Miree and Wallis was applicable, but concluded
that no identifiable federal policy would be threatened if state law were applied. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
635 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Chapman v. Dow Chem. Co., 454 U.S. 1128 (198 1). Therefore,
the lower court's jurisdiction would have to be based on diversity of citizenship and state law would control the disposition
of the case. Comment, supra note 9, at 210. On remand, the district court, faced with claims parties from numerous states
as well as Australia and New Zealand, decided to apply a "national consensus law" with respect to the liability issue and
the government contract defense. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). On
petition for writ of mandamus, the circuit court acknowledged that the Agent Orange litigation required a single
dispositive trial on various common issues and tacitly approved the use of a national consensus law approach. In re
Diamond Shamrock, 725 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
349. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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of state law by federal law. Applying these criteria, the Agent Orange court
concluded that federal law should control the application of the government contract
defense.
First, the court pointed out that the Supreme Court had recognized the
"distinctively federal" nature of the relationship between the government and its
military suppliers. 350 The court also noted that any decision about the extent of a
contractor's liability would affect future dealings between the contractor and the
government. 351 Furthermore, the court observed that federal law ordinarily controlled
the construction and applicability of federal contracts. 352 Finally, the court declared
that the federal concern was particularly great in the case of Agent Orange because
the contracts were performed under the provisions of the Defense Production Act. 353
The court also determined that there was a substantial federal interest in
achieving a uniform liability standard for government suppliers. The court reasoned
that it would be grossly unfair to subject a defense contractor, who produced war
material under the compulsion of federal law, to the laws of dozens of different states
for the purpose of determining what standard governed its liability for product
defects. 354
Finally, the court concluded that state interests would not be seriously impaired
if state law were displaced by federal common law. The court observed that few states
had developed any rule regarding the liability of a government contractor to
servicemen for injuries from military equipment. 355 Consequently, the court ruled
that federal law applied under the supremacy clause to the government contract
defense. 356
The court in Bynum 357 also declared that federal law should determine the nature
and scope of the government contract defense. The court applied the Clearfield
analysis to determine whether federal common law was applicable. According to the
Bynum court, it was necessary to consider whether the question at issue had any
substantial bearing upon "uniquely federal" interests. 358 If federal interests were
implicated, the court stated that it must then determine whether it should apply federal
common law or state law as the applicable rule.359 This inquiry essentially involved
350. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977).
351. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 704 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
352. Prieve & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F.
Supp. 690, 704 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
353. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 846-47. The court conceded that there were some decisions under state law, but all of them were suits
by individual soldiers or civilians injured either by nonmilitary products such as bulldozers or dough mixers, or by defects
in airplanes and explosives, objects whose misuse is frequently regulated by state tort law. None of these cases, in the
court's opinion, implicated to the same extent any of the federal interests involved in the manufacture of Agent Orange.
Id. at 847.
356. Id. Furthermore, the court held that the same result would be reached under Erie using the national consensus
law approach set forth in its conflicts of law opinion. Id.
357. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985).
358. Id. at 568 (citing Texas Indust., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)); Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1323 (5th Cir. 1985).
359. 770 F.2d at 568 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); Georgia Power Co.
v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Georgia Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres of Land,
450 U.S. 936 (1981)).
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focusing on the effect that applying state law would have on the federal interests and
the extent to which imposition of federal common law would disrupt important and
legitimate state policies. 360
Applying these criteria to government contractor liability, the court in Bynum
first concluded that a significant federal interest was involved even when the
government itself was not a party to the suit. The federal interest at stake was
responsibility for military decisions. The court declared that:
The composition, training, equipping, and management of our military forces is a matter
exclusively within the rights and duties of the federal government, and, as a result, any
interference with the federal authority over national defense and military affairs implicates
uniquely federal interests of the most basic sort.361
The court added that the design of military equipment was essentially a military
decision. Moreover, a suit by a serviceman alleging that the government defectively
designed its military equipment posed a threat to military discipline. 362 Therefore, the
court concluded that a significant federal interest was at stake and that this interest
would be frustrated if state law, permitting or requiring judical intervention into
military decisionmaking, was applied. 363
The court acknowledged that state products liability doctrines promoted a
number of legitimate goals. However, it concluded that these interests were not as
great in the case of military equipment and, in any event, were outweighed by
superior federal interests. 364 Accordingly, the court ruled that a federally recognized
government contract defense should be applied. 36
A California intermediate appellate court in McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft366
also concluded that federal law should apply in cases where a supplier raised the
government contract defense. The plaintiff in that case was seriously injured when his
Sikorsky HH-3A combat and rescue helicopter crashed. The accident occurred when
the flight control linkage, which controlled the fore and aft pitch axis of the
helicopter, disconnected in flight. 367 The plaintiff brough suit against Sikorsky, the
manufacturer of the helicopter. The jury held in favor of the defendant, even though
the trial court refused to give an instruction on the government contract defense. 368
On appeal, the intermediate appellate court held that the manufacturer should
have been allowed to raise the government contract defense.369 In addition, the court
360. Id. at 568 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979); Georgia Power Co. v.
Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Georgia Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres of Land, 450
U.S. 936 (1981)).
361. Id. at 569.
362. Id. at 570.
363. Id. at 571.
364. Id. at 571-72.
365. Id. at 574.
366. 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981).
367. Id. at 207, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 765. The linkage connection consisted of a bolt, castellated nut and a cotter pin.
Navy personnel failed to replace the cotter pin during servicing. This caused the nut to vibrate loose and allowed the bolt
to come out of the linkage. The plaintiff alleged that redundant self-locking fasteners in the flight control linkage system
would have prevented the accident. Id.
368. Id. at 210, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
369. Id.
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concluded that the issue was one which implicated federal interests. The court
observed that the relationship between servicemen and the government was derived
from federal sources and governed by federal law. Furthermore, torts committed by
the suppliers of military hardware against military personnel "interfered" with this
relationship, thereby affecting federal interests.370
The McLaughlin court also found that federal interests would be threatened by
the lack of uniformity that would result if state law were applied. Echoing the
concerns of the Agent Orange court, 371 the California court declared that it would be
unfair to both servicemen and suppliers to treat similar cases differently because of
differences in state law.372 Finally, the court determined that contrary state law on the
subject would not be displaced since California courts had not yet formulated a
government contract doctrine of their own for products liability cases. 373
The McLaughlin court's view did not go unchallenged. A strongly worded
dissent contended that the application of the government contract defense should be
decided under state law. 374 The dissenting opinion pointed out that California courts
historically had accorded broad protection to consumers harmed by defective
products. 375 In the dissent's view, the state's interest in compensating injured
consumers outweighed any federal interests in extending the government contract
doctrine into the products liability area.376
The reasoning of Agent Orange, Bynum, and McLaughlin is more persuasive
than that of Brown. A supplier who raises the government contract defense attempts
to share in the federal government's sovereign immunity. Questions about the scope
of such immunity should be resolved by federal law and not by state law. 37 7
Furthermore, at least where federal contractors are concerned, the federal interest in
protecting the policy decision of its officials outweighs any competing state interest
in compensating tort victims. 378 Consequently, even if the government contract
defense is a narrow one, its nature and scope should be determined by federal law.
V. CONCLUSION
In the past decade, the government contract defense, which originally protected
contractors who constructed public works projects for the government, has been
successfully invoked by manufacturers to avoid liability for injuries caused by
defectively designed products in cases where the federal government established or
approved the product's design. 379
370. Id.
371. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
372. McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 211, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768 (1981).
373. Id. at 211-12, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
374. Id. at 212, 195 Cal Rptr. at 769.
375. Id. at 214, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
376. Id.
377. Note, supra note 9, at 224-25.
378. Note, supra note 348, 614-24.
379. See supra notes 87-139 and accompanying text.
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Although use of the government contract defense in products liability cases has
been criticized by some commentators, 380 proponents of the doctrine have made a
persuasive case to support immunity for those who supply products to the govern-
ment. First, it is unfair to impose liability on product suppliers for design defects that
they did not create and could not control. 381 Second, a rule of contractor immunity
is needed to limit the cost of government procurement contracts. 382 Finally, military
autonomy would be threatened if injured servicemen were allowed to recover against
government contractors for defectively designed military equipment. 383
Because these concerns are similar to the concerns expresssed by the Court in
Feres v. United States,384 many courts have assumed that the government contract
defense and the Feres doctrine share the same rationale. 385 However, the discretion-
ary function exception to the FTCA provides a better analogy. The discretionary
function exception protects the executive branch of government against unwarranted
judical interference; 386 the government contract defense responds to the same
concern.
387
Indentifying government decisionmaking as the interest protected by the
government contract defense helps to delineate the doctrine's nature and scope.
Hence, the government contract defense should not be limited to those who supply
military equipment to the government, 388 nor should it be confined to suits by military
personnel. 389 Furthermore, since the government contract defense is only concerned
with protecting informed decisionmaking, suppliers should be required to disclose
design risks to government officers. 39°
380. E.g., Note, supra note 9, at 221; Note, supra, note 4, at 1085-86; Note, supra note 154, at 208-09; Comment,
supra note 15, at 721.
381. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 793-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. deniedsub nom.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Comment, supra note 189, at 1073.
382. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449
(9th Cir. 1983).
383. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403,405 (4th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736,
742 (1 th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
384. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
385. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 P.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.1. Case Co. 756 F.2d 591,597 (7th Cir.
1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co.,755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 72
(1986); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger. on 9111182, 769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom.. Eschler v.
Boeing Co., 106 S. Ct. 851 (1986); Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
386. Rogers, supra note 13, at 807.
387. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1982); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J.
Super. 1, 9,364 A.2d 43, 47 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 75 N.J. 66, 384 A.2d 846 (1978); Comment, supra note 15, at 705-06.
388. Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (lth Cir. 1985); Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp.
1359, 1361 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
389. Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1985) (veterinarian); Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F.
Supp. 1359 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (fireman); Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980),
aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981) (resturant owner's minor child).
390. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736,746 (1 th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704
F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F.
Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, sub nom. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067
(1984).
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The question of supplier participation in the design process is a difficult one. In
many instances, design specifications may originate solely from the supplier, or they
may be the product of an extended series of negotiations between the supplier and
government officials. Although some commentators disagree, 391 the government
contract defense should not be limited to situations in which the government alone
formulates the product's design. Rather, it should potentially apply to any case where
government officials choose to accept a particular design risk, when they have been
fully informed of the risk and available design alternatives. 392
Another unresolved issue is whether federal law or state law should be used to
determine the applicability of the government contract defense. Federal law appears
to be the appropriate choice in the case of federal procurement contracts since the
government contract doctrine protects the interests of the federal government. 393
One remaining task is to devise a formula for determining when contractors can
seek immunity under the government contract defense. As mentioned earlier, several
formulas have been proposed by the courts. 394 Of these, the approach developed by
the court in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.395 provides the best starting point.
The formula in Shaw permits a supplier to invoke the government contract defense if
it does not participate in the product's design, or if the supplier informs government
officials of risks and alternative designs, and the government nevertheless chooses to
retain the original design.
However, the Shaw standard can be applied to a broader range of cases,
including those that do not involve military products, if certain modifications are
made. First, the government contract defense should only be available to the supplier
if the government is immune from suit. This ensures that the supplier is not left
defenseless when the government can avoid liability by asserting its sovereign
immunity. However, the government's claim of sovereign immunity does not have to
rest on the Feres doctrine; it can also arise from one of the exceptions to the FICA.
If this criterion is satisfied, the supplier should be required to show that it had
no input into the design, or, if it did, that government officials, not the supplier, had
the final responsibility for approving the product's design. The supplier should also
have to establish that it informed the government of all design risks of which it knew
or should have known. When the supplier participates in the design process, it should
also be required to show that it informed the government about safer design
alternatives if any existed. If these conditions are met, one can assume that
government officials assumed full responsibility for the product's ultimate design.
391. Comment, supra note 15, at 721.
392. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 704 F.2d 444,450 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Shaw
v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (1lth Cir. 1985).
393. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 568-71 (5th Cir. 1985); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597
F. Supp. 740, 846-47 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203,211-12, 195 Cal. Rptr.
764, 768 (1981).
394. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d
736, 746 (11th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1043 (1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, sub nom.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
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SURROGATE IMMUNITY
Since a decision of this sort would be protected by the discretionary function
exception, it is appropriate to extend similar protection to the contractor as well.
The formula proposed above will insulate a supplier from liability when
responsible government officials make a conscious decision to subject product users
and others to a known risk. Will suppliers also avoid liability for risks that were not
known at the time the product's design was approved by the government? One might
argue that contractor immunity is not necessary to protect the decisionmaking
processes of the government since no decision to assume a risk was made. However,
this conclusion would not be consistent with the courts' interpretation of the
discretionary function exception.
Government officials are often forced to make planning decisions without being
fully aware of the risks involved. Nevertheless, these decisions are usually charac-
terized as "discretionary" for purposes of invoking sovereign immunity. The
Dalehite case provides an excellent example of this: although government officials
may have been aware of the general risk of explosion from the components of nitrate
fertilizer, they probably did not anticipate that packaged fertilizer could destroy a
city. In spite of this, the Court held that the fertilizer export program was the product
of planning level decisions. It follows that contractors should not be liable for the
consequences of unknown risks, assuming that their ignorance was not culpable,
when the government can escape liability by claiming its sovereign immunity.
The government contract defense, like many other doctrines in the law of
products liability, is in a state of flux. Unless the United States Supreme Court issues
a definitive ruling on the subject, the controversy over the defense's proper role, and
even its very legitimacy, will continue for some time to come.
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